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Abstract
Wedevelop a tractable dynamicmodel of productivity growth and technology spillovers
that is consistent with the emergence of real world empirical productivity distributions.
Firms can improve productivity by engaging in in-house R&D, or alternatively, by try-
ing to imitate other firms’ technologies, subject to the limits of their absorptive capaci-
ties. The outcome of both strategies is stochastic. The choice between in-house R&D and
imitation is endogenous, and based on firms’ profit maximization motive. Firms closer
to the technological frontier face fewer imitation opportunities, and choose in-house
R&D, while firms farther from the frontier try to imitate more productive technologies.
The equilibrium choice leads to a balanced-growth equilibrium featuring persistent pro-
ductivity differences even when starting from ex-ante identical firms. The long-run pro-
ductivity distribution can be described as a traveling wave with tails following a Pareto
as can be observed in the empirical data.
Key words: innovation, growth, quality ladder, absorptive capacity, productivity
differences, spillovers
JEL: O40, E10
1. Introduction
There are large and persistent productivity differences not only across countries [e.g.
Durlauf, 1996; Feyrer, 2008; Quah, 1997], but also across firms and plants within coun-
tries [Baily et al., 1992]. Such differences largely reflect the use of different technologies
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Figure 1: The left panel shows the total factor productivity (TFP) distribution of French firms over the
years from 1995 to 2003 (vertical axes in logarithmic scale). The right-hand panel shows the mean and
standard deviation of the log-TFP, with fitted regression lines (color online).
and managerial practices [see, e.g. Bloom and Reenen, 2011; Doms et al., 1997]. Con-
sider, for instance, the distribution of total factor productivity (TFP) from a balanced
panel of 17,404 French firms in the periods between 1995 to 2003.1 Figure 1 (color online)
shows how the empirical distribution evolves over time. Three main features emerge.
First, the distribution of high-productivity firms is well described by a power-law.2 Sec-
ond, the distribution of low-productivity firms also is approximated by a power-law,
although this approximation is less accurate, arguably due to noisy data at low produc-
tivity levels. Third, the distribution is well approximated by a distribution that shifts in
an affine way at a constant rate over time. We call a distribution with the latter charac-
teristics a traveling wave.3 While entry, exit and reallocation are important determinants
of firm dynamics, they altogether account for only 25% of total productivity growth
[Acemoglu, 2009, Chap. 18]. Therefore, a theory of firm-level productivity dynamics
must explain the determinants of the accumulation of technical knowledge among in-
cumbent firms. To further the understanding of these factors, in this paper we propose
a theory, related to Acemoglu et al. [2006], where firms can upgrade productivity over
time through two alternative strategies: either by carrying out ”in-house R&D”, or by
1The data are from the Amadeus database provided by Bureau van Dijk. The firm-level TFPs are
estimated following the method introduced by Levinsohn and Petrin [2003]. A detailed description of
the estimation method, and additional details about the data, can be found in Sections B.2 in the online
technical Appendix B.
2Pareto distributions are also observed for distributions of several other economic variables of interest
(e.g. firm size) in numerous empirical studies [e.g. De Wit, 2005; Gabaix, 1999; Saichev et al., 2009].
3In Section 5, we provide a formal definition (Definition 1) of a traveling wave.
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imitating technologies used by other firms. The choice is driven by a standard profit-
maximizing motive. The focus of the theory on the innovation-vs.-imitation margin
is motivated by two observations. On the one hand, an important source of differ-
ences in technological know-how is the large variation across firms in R&D investments
and in their success [Coad, 2009; Cohen and Klepper, 1992, 1996]. On the other hand,
many firms do not invest at all in R&D; their productivity increases through the adop-
tion of technology already in use from other firms. Thus, technical knowledge diffuses
over time, albeit only slowly [Comin and Mestieri, 2013; Eeckhout and Jovanovic, 2002;
Geroski, 2000; Griliches, 1957; Stoneman, 2002]. Our theory can reproduce, both quali-
tatively and quantitatively, the empirical regularities outlined above.
The model economy is a Schumpeterian quality-ladder growth model, in the spirit
of Acemoglu et al. [2006], where differentiated intermediate goods are produced by
monopolistically competitive firms. Firms producing different varieties have heteroge-
neous productivities that increase over time driven by firms’ endeavours to improve
their technologies. For simplicity, we abstract from resource costs of R&D or imitation
– the two strategies for increasing productivity. Since a firm cannot pursue both R&D
and imitation at the same time, the opportunity cost of imitating is the return from R&D,
and viceversa. R&D activity is modelled as a draw from an exogenous distribution of
productivity upgrades. Imitation is modeled as a ”matching process” whereby each
imitating firm is randomly matched with another firm, and can then succeed or fail in
imitating the other firm’s technology. The optimal choice between the two strategies
hinges on the firm’s position in the overall productivity distribution. Firms far from
the technology frontier are more likely to be matched with higher-productivity firms,
and optimally choose imitation. In contrast, firms close to the technology frontier are
less likely to find better firms from which they can learn, and therefore are more prone
to choosing in-house R&D.4 Our model yields a steady-state productivity distribution
with trending productivity resembling the empirical distribution of Figure 1. More for-
mally, the theoretical distribution is a traveling wave with an exponentially growing
average and power-law tails. We obtain an analytical representation of the equilibrium
law of motion of the distribution in terms of a system of ordinary differential equations
(ODEs), and even a complete analytical characterization of the steady-state distribution
(traveling wave) consistent with the equilibrium law of motion. This characterization is
the main contribution of our paper.
We contrast the results with alternative environments. We show that, on the one
4More formally, in our model there exists a relative productivity threshold below which firms always
imitate, and above which they always innovate. This prediction of our model is consistent with the
empirical evidence that firms closer to the technology frontier engage in more R&D investments [see
Griffith et al., 2003].
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hand, a traveling wave would not emerge in an economy where some firms always
do R&D and others always imitate. In such an economy, the variance of the produc-
tivity distribution would grow over time, counterfactually. The reason is that the sub-
population of innovating firms would be excluded from any spillover from the growth
at the frontier, causing an ever growing lower tail. On the other hand, the traveling
wave would emerge in an economy in which each firm is assigned randomly to an in-
novation strategy in every period. Thus, what matters for our result is not that firms
choose optimally between R&D and imitation, but that there is some ”mixing” so that
in every period firms lagging behind resort to imitation with some probability. More
generally, the crux of the result is that all firms end up benefiting, sooner or later, from
the spillovers accruing from the frontier productivity growth. Such spillovers ensure
that a firm whose productivity is relatively low can grow more quickly as the frontier
moves farther away. The case of profit-maximizing firms choosing between innovation
and imitation is an economically interesting example of this mechanism: any repeatedly
unsuccessful firm pursuing R&D can avoid falling too far behind by switching into im-
itation.
As an important extension, we study an economy in which firms have a limited ca-
pacity to absorb knowledge through imitation [Cohen and Levinthal, 1989; Kogut and
Zander, 1992; Nelson and Phelps, 1966]. Namely, when a firm is matched with a more
productive one, it can absorb only a (stochastic) share of the knowledge possessed by
the other firm. The assumption of a limited absorptive capacity has no major bearing on
the qualitative characterization of the equilibrium. However, this realistic feature turns
out to improve significantly the quantitative fit of the theory – e.g., relative to the em-
pirical distribution of Figure 1. Intuitively, in the model with an unlimited absorptive
capacity, laggard firms benefit strongly from the spillovers arising from progress at the
frontier. Thus, if one calibrates the model so as to fit the productivity spread observed
in the data, the model (which is very parsimonious in the number of parameters) over-
predicts productivity growth. In contrast, the model with a limited absorptive capacity
slows down convergence within the distribution, yielding a much better fit with the em-
pirical distribution. Another insight (hinging on numerical analysis) is that when the
absorptive capacity is sufficiently small relative to the return to innovation, one obtains
an ever growing variance rather than a traveling wave.
The explicit formulation of firms’ R&Dbehavior and the endogenous choice between
innovation and imitation distinguishes our model from most of the previous literature.
Klette and Kortum [2004] model the R&D decisions of multiproduct firms, but do not
discuss imitation. Luttmer [2007] focuses on entry, exit and selection in a world where
incumbent firms are subject to exogenous productivity shocks, and entrant firms can im-
itate incumbents. His model, like ours, generates a traveling wave. There are two main
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differences relative to our paper. First, we focus on the endogenous decision of inno-
vation vs. imitation by incumbent firms. Second, form a technical standpoint, Luttmer
[2007] proposes an environment with continuous firm sizes, while here we analyze a
Schumpeterian quality ladder model with discrete productivity steps. Nevertheless,
despite the differences, in both cases a traveling wave solutions can be obtained. More-
over, Acemoglu and Cao [2015] construct, as we do, a Schumpeterian model. They
obtain Zipf’s law for large firm sizes, while we focus on productivity. In their model,
incumbent firms engage in incremental innovations, while entry is associated with rad-
ical innovations and creative destruction (i.e., the successful entrant replaces the incum-
bent). As in Luttmer [2007], their model does not feature an endogenous choice of the
R&D strategy. Ghiglino [2011] constructs a search-based growth model which gener-
ates Pareto-distributed productivity levels focusing on the recombination of existing
technologies into novel ones. In Perla and Tonetti [2014] firms can choose either to pro-
duce, or to search for existing technologies to imitate.5 Differently from our model, their
paper features no in-house R&D. Other papers focusing on innovation and imitation in-
clude Eeckhout and Jovanovic [2002], and Atkeson and Burstein [2010]. None of these
focuses on the innovation-vs-imitation trade off.
Alvarez et al. [2008]; Lucas [2008] and Lucas and Moll [2014] study models of tech-
nology diffusion using the framework of Eaton and Kortum [1999]. Each producer
draws from a random sample of firms and “copies” the technology of the firm with
which it is matched whenever the latter has a better technology. These papers are re-
lated to our work, and explore dimensions that we do not consider. For instance, Lucas
and Moll [2014] focus on the trade-off in the use of time between production and im-
itation and on the effects of progressive taxation. Relative to our contribution, these
authors neither model explicitly the strategic decisions of firms whether to undertake
in-house R&D or to copy other firms, nor do they take into account limitations in the
ability of firms to imitate external knowledge. Because in their model firms can only
copy from existing firms (or ideas), the equilibrium dynamics would converge in the
long run to a mass point corresponding to the productivity level of the most productive
firm. To avoid such a degenerate long-run distribution, they assume an unbounded
distribution of knowledge. This is not necessary in our model, since here firms that are
close to the technology frontier choose endogenously to innovate (i.e., draw from an
exogenous productivity distribution) rather than to adopt technologies from a pool of
existing ideas.
Our paper is also related to two recent contributions that were written simultane-
ously and independently of our paper. Benhabib et al. [2014] study a simplified de-
5For a recent extension of this model see Perla et al. [2014].
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terministic framework where agents make an optimal portfolio choice between invest-
ments in innovation and adoption. Luttmer [2012] extends the model of selection and
growth of Luttmer [2007] to an environment in which also incumbent firms can perform
imitation. He obtains, as we do, convergence to a stable (balanced growth) productivity
distribution. However, both the environment and the technique of analysis are different.
In particular, in his model productivity growth is governed by a Brownian motion while
we consider a standard Schumpeterian quality-ladder model. In this respect, our paper
also relates to an earlier Schumpeterian growth literature where firms make a choice be-
tween innovation and imitation, including Cheng and Dinopoulos [1996], Segerstrom
[1991], Jovanovic and Rob [1990], and Acemoglu et al. [2006]. These papers, however,
do not study the endogenous evolution of the productivity distribution of firms.
The paper is organized as follows. The static model environment is introduced in
Section 2. Section 3 discusses the law of motion of the productivity distribution. Section
4 studies the evolution of the distribution in an economy where the innovation strat-
egy (in-house R&D vs. imitation) is a deterministic fixed effect of each firm. Section
5 yields the main result, characterizing the productivity distribution in a model where
firms choose optimally whether to perform in-house R&D or to imitate. Sections 6 and
7 consider two extensions, and Section 8 concludes. The proofs of all propositions and
lemmas, together with some additional results referred to in the text are provided in
Appendix A. Additional technical material, including extensions and details of the cal-
ibration, are provided in an online technical Appendix B.
2. The Model
In the following sections we provide a micro-foundation of our model based on a mo-
nopolistically competitive environment with a competitive fringe in each sector (see
Section 2.1), and introduce the basic processes of innovation and imitation (see Section
2.2) leading to productivity improvements.
2.1. Environment
Themodel economy is a version of Acemoglu et al. [2006] comprising a competitive final
good sector and a continuum of unit measure of monopolistic sectors producing differ-
entiated intermediated goods. The final good, denoted by Y(t), is produced by a repre-
sentative firm using labor and a set of intermediate goods xi(t), i ∈ N = {1, 2, . . . ,N}.
6
Its technology is represented by the following production function:
Y(t) =
1
α
L1−α
N
∑
i=1
Ai (t)
1−α xi(t)α , α ∈ (0, 1),
where t denotes time, xi is the intermediate good i, and Ai is the technology level of
industry i. We normalize the labor force to unity, L = 1. The final good can be used for
consumption, as an input to R&D, and also as an input to the production of intermediate
goods. Its price is set to be the numeraire. The profit maximization program yields the
following inverse demand function for intermediate goods:,
pi(t) =
(
Ai(t)
xi(t)
)1−α
.
Each intermediate good i is produced by a technology leader who has access to the best
technology. By this best-practice technology the marginal cost of producing any inter-
mediate input equals one unit of the final good. The leader is subject to the potential
competition of a fringe of firms that can produce the same input albeit at a higher con-
stant marginal cost, χ, where 1 < χ ≤ 1/α. Note that a higher value of χ indicates less
competition. Bertrand competition implies that each technology leader monopolizes its
market, sets the price equal to the unit cost of the fringe, pi(t) = χ, and sells the quan-
tity xi(t) = χ
− 11−αAi(t). Namely, the equilibrium entails a limit price strategy and an
inactive fringe as in Acemoglu et al. [2006]. The profit earned by the incumbent in any
intermediate sector i is then proportional to productivity,
πi(t) = (pi(t)− 1) xi(t) = ψAi(t), (1)
where we have denoted by ψ ≡ χ−1α χ−
1
1−α . In equilibrium, gross output is proportional
to aggregate productivity:
Ytot(t) =
1
α
χ−
α
1−α
N
∑
i=1
Ai(t) =
1
α
χ−
α
1−αA(t),
where aggregate productivity is A(t) = ∑Ni=1 Ai(t). Similarly, net aggregate output,
defined as final output minus the cost of intermediate production, is given by Ynet(t) =
Ytot(t)−∑Ni=1 xi(t) = ζA(t), where ζ ≡ (χ− α) 1αχ−
1
1−α .6
6Given the proportionate relationship between productivity and output, all results we derive on pro-
ductivity also hold for firm size (as measured, e.g., by value added). However, since we are mainly inter-
ested in the process of technological change and productivity growth, we focus on productivity instead
of firm size dynamics.
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Throughout the rest of the paper, when referring to firm i we always mean the most
efficient producer in sector i. Moreover, our population of firms comprises only the set
of technology leaders in each sector. These choices are not a source of confusion since
fringe firms are inactive in equilibrium.
2.2. Technological Change
The productivity of each intermediate good i ∈ N is assumed to take on values along a
quality ladder with rungs spaced proportionally by a factor A¯ > 1. Productivity starts
at A¯0 = 1 and the subsequent rungs are A¯1, A¯2, A¯3, . . . . Firm i, which has achieved ai
productivity improvements then has productivity Ai = A¯
ai .
Firm i’s productivity Ai ∈ {1, A¯, A¯2, . . . } grows as a result of technology improve-
ments, either undertaken in-house (innovation) or due to the imitation and absorption
of other firms’ technologies. The technology comes from firms in other sectors that were
successful in innovating in their area of activity [Fai and Von Tunzelmann, 2001; Kelly,
2001; Rosenberg, 1976]. We consider a discrete time model where in each time period
from t to t + ∆t, ∆t > 0, a firm i is selected at random and decides either to imitate
another firm or to conduct in-house R&D, depending on which option yields higher
expected profits.7
2.2.1. Innovation
If firm i conducts in-house R&D at time t then it makes ϑ(t) productivity improvements
and its productivity changes as follows:
Ai(t+ ∆t) = A¯
ai(t)+ϑ(t) = Ai(t)A¯
ϑ(t). (2)
ϑ(t) ≥ 0 is a nonnegative integer-valued random variable with a certain distribution.
Let us denote by ηb ≡ P(ϑ(t) = b) for b = 0, 1, 2, . . . to quantify the distribution,
satisfying ∑∞b=0 ηb = 1. From the productivity growth dynamics above we can go to
an equivalent system by changing to the log-productivity ai(t) = log Ai(t)/ log A¯. We
can simplify the notation if we take A¯ as the base of the logarithm, so that log A¯ = 1.
This allows us to write log-productivity as ai(t) = log Ai(t). Then, taking logs of the
in-house update map in Equation (2) gives
ai(t+ ∆t) = ai(t) + ϑ(t). (3)
An illustration of this productivity growth process can be seen in Figure 2. Note that
7We explain the innovation and imitation process in more detail in Section 3 below.
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ai ai + 1 ai + 2 ai + 3
a
η1 η2 η3
Figure 2: Illustration of the innovation process of firm i with log-productivity log -productivity log Ai =
ai log A¯ = ai (setting log A¯ = 1). With probability η1 firm i makes one productivity improvement and
advances by one log-productivity unit, with probability η2 firm i makes two productivity improvements
and advances by two log-productivity units, etc.
log-productivity undergoes a simple stochastic process with additive noise, while pro-
ductivity follows a stochastic process with multiplicative noise, with the stochastic fac-
tor being the random variable A¯ϑ. In the limit of continuous time we obtain a geometric
Brownian motion for productivity [see e.g. Saichev et al., 2009, pp. 9].
In our analysis below, we restrict attention to the case in which innovation is an
incremental step-by-step process , i.e., η0 = 1− p, η1 = p, ηb = 0 for b = 2, 3, . . . This is
for simplicity. All results can be extended to the case in which ηb > 0 for all b ≤ B < ∞.
2.2.2. Imitation
In the case of imitation, firm i with productivity Ai(t) selects another firm j at random
from the population of firms, N , and attempts to imitate its productivity Aj(t) as long
as Aj(t) > Ai(t), which is equivalent to aj(t) > ai(t). Conditional on firm i selecting
a firm j with higher productivity, firm i tries to climb the rungs of the quality ladder
which separates it from aj(t). We assume that each firms climb each rung with a success
probability q ∈ [0, 1]. Moreover, the attempt finishes after the first failure. This reflects
the fact that knowledge absorption is cumulative and the growth of knowledge builds
on the already existing knowledge base [Kogut and Zander, 1992; Weitzman, 1998].
Taking the above mentioned process of imitation more formally, firm i’s productivity
changes according to
Ai(t+ ∆t) = Ai(t)A¯
κ = A¯ai(t)+κ, (4)
where κ is a random variable which takes values in {0, 1, 2, . . . , aj(t) − ai(t)} and de-
notes the number of rungs to be climbed towards aj(t). The distribution of κ depends
9
ai ai + 1 ai + 2 aj
a
q q 1− q
Figure 3: Illustration of the imitation of log-productivity aj of firm j through firm i with log-productivity
ai, where the log-productivity of firm i is log Ai = ai log A¯ = ai (setting log A¯ = 1). Firm i successfully
imitates two log-productivity units (with probability q2) but fails to imitate the third log-productivity unit
(with probability 1− q). It then ends up with a log-productivity of ai + 2.
on the distance aj(t)− ai(t) and is quantified as
P(κ = k|aj(t)− ai(t) = d) =


qk(1− q) if 0 ≤ k < d,
qk if k = d,
0 otherwise.
(5)
Note, that ∑∞k=0 P(κ = k) = 1, as necessary for a proper probability measure. Moreover,
for q = 0 we have that Ai(t+ ∆t) = Ai(t), for q = 1 we have Ai(t+ ∆t) = Aj(t) while
for 0 < q < 1 it holds that Ai(t) ≤ Ai(t + ∆t) ≤ Aj(t). This motivates us to call the
parameter q a measure of firms’ absorptive capacities. The higher q, the better firms are
able to climb rungs on the quality ladder.
Switching to log-productivity and setting log A¯ = 1 in Equation (4) we obtain8
ai(t+ ∆t) = ai(t) + κ. (6)
An illustration of this imitation process can be seen in Figure 3.
8If firm i with log-productivity ai(t) attempts to imitate firm j with log-productivity aj(t) > ai(t)
then the expected log-productivity i obtains is given by Et
[
ai(t+ ∆t)|ai(t) = a, aj(t) = b
]
= ∑b−a−1c=0 (a+
c)(1− q)qc + bqb−a = a + q 1−qb−a1−q . If q < 1 and b is much larger than a, the following approximation
holds: Et
[
ai(t+ ∆t)|ai(t) = a, aj(t) = b
] ≈ a + q1−q . In this case, the log-productivity firm i obtains
through imitation does not depend on the log-productivity of firm j but only on its success probability q.
However, it depends on the log-productivity of firm j if aj(t) is close to ai(t). The latter becomes effective
for example for firms with a high productivity when there are only few other firms remaining with higher
productivities that could be imitated.
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3. Evolution of the Productivity Distribution
In this section, we analyze the evolution of the productivity distribution. We first estab-
lish some useful notation. We then proceed by characterizing the equilibrium dynamics
of the productivity distribution.
3.1. Characterization of the Productivity Dynamics
Consider the distribution of log-productivity ai(t) = log Ai(t) in the population of
N ∈ N firms over time, where N is assumed to be a large number. Let S denote
the set of log-productivity values, that is S = {log A¯, 2 log A¯, . . .}. Assuming that
log A¯ = 1 this is simply the set of positive integers, N. Further, let Pa(t) indicate the
fraction of firms having log-productivity a ∈ S at time t ∈ T. Thus, the row vec-
tor P(t) = (P1(t), P2(t), . . . , Pa(t), . . . ) represents the distribution of log-productivity
at time t. Notice that the vector is infinite to the right. It holds that Pa(t) ≥ 0 and
∑
∞
a=1 Pa(t) = 1. In what follows we may omit for simplicity either a or t in the argu-
ments of Pa(t) whenever it causes no confusion.
Our dynamics of innovation and imitation induces a discrete time, discrete space
family of Markov chains
(
(PN(t))t∈T
)∞
N=N0
, where eachmember (PN(t))t∈T indexed by
N ≥ N0 (N0 ∈ N being some arbitrary lower bound on the number of firms) is aMarkov
chain that takes on values in the state space PN = {P ∈ R|S|+ : N · P ∈ N|S|,∑a∈S Pa =
1}, i.e. the state space of frequency vectors for a specified N indicating the fraction
of firms with a certain log-productivity a ∈ S . At times t ∈ T = {0,∆t, 2∆t, . . . }, with
∆t = 1/N, exactly one firm in the population of N firms is selected at random and given
the opportunity to introduce a technology improvement (through either innovation or
imitation, as discussed in the following sections). The probability Tab : P
N → R|S|×|S|+
that a firm that is selected with log-productivity a switches to log-productivity b at time
t is given by
Tab(P) = P
(
PN (t+ ∆t) = P+
1
N
(eb − ea)
∣∣∣∣ PN (t) = P
)
,
where ea ∈ R|S| is the standard unit basis vector corresponding to log-productivity
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a ∈ S . The transition probabilities of our Markov chain (PN(t))t∈T are then given by
P
(
PN (t+ ∆t) = P+ z
∣∣∣ PN (t) = P)
=


PaTab(P) if z =
1
N (eb − ea), a, b ∈ S , a 6= b,
1−∑b∈S ∑b 6=a PaTab(P) if z = 0,
0 otherwise.
With these definitions we are able to derive the differential Equation governing the evo-
lution of the productivity distribution by using the following proposition:9
Proposition 1. Consider the Markov chain (PN(t))t∈T with transition matrix T(P). Define
V(P) ≡ P(t)(T(P) − I) and let
V¯(P) =
⋂
ε>0
cl
(
conv
(
V
(
{P′ ∈ R|S|+ : ‖P− P′‖ ≤ ε}
)))
be the closed convex hull of all values of V that obtain vectors P′ arbitrarily close to P. Then in
the limit of a large number N of firms, the evolution of the log-productivity distribution P(t) is
given by the differential inclusion
∂P(t)
∂t
∈ V¯(P(t)), (7)
for some initial distribution P(0) : S → [0, 1]. Moreover, if T(P) is Lipschitz continuous in P,
then the evolution of the log-productivity distribution P(t) is given by the differential equation
∂P(t)
∂t
= V(P(t)) = P(t)(T(P(t)) − I). (8)
Note that Proposition 1 covers the general case of the transition matrix T(P) not
being Lipschitz continuous. Then, the evolution of the log-productivity distribution
follows a differential inclusion (i.e. a set-valued differential equation) as in Equation
(7).10 In the case of a Lipschitz continuous T(P), we can simply write the evolution
of the productivity distribution as a differential equation, which is stated in Equation
(8). Moreover, at all points of continuity of T(P) the differential inclusion is actually a
differential equation.
In the following sections, we derive the matrix T(P) with elements Tab(P), a, b ∈ S ,
under the individual firms’ laws of motion associated with innovation in Equation (3)
9This proposition is an application of deterministic approximation theorems for discrete time Markov
chains [cf. Kurtz, 1970; Sandholm, 2010]. We refer in particular to Chapter 10 of Sandholm [2010] for a
more detailed discussion of these approximation techniques.
10See also Aubin and Cellina [1984].
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and imitation in Equation (6), respectively.
In Section 4 we look at the case where the decision to innovate vs. imitate is exoge-
nous and fixed, and that this will be in contrast to the case in which a given firm will
either imitate or innovate at different times, as will naturally occur when the choice is
endogenous. Moreover, in the exogenous case, one can show that the log-productivity
distribution of the population of the firms engaging in in-house R&D converges to a
normal distribution with increasing variance over time (cf. Proposition 2). However,
we do not observe such a divergence in the variance of empirically observed productiv-
ities as illustrated in Figure 1. In a more realistic model, it is therefore necessary to allow
firms to engage in both innovation and imitation in order to advance their productivity
levels. This is the case we are going to discuss in the subsequent Section 5, where the
general model is introduced.
4. Exogenous Innovation-Imitation Strategies
In this section, we introduce some key notation and provide an analysis of the evolu-
tion of the productivity distribution in a world where R&D strategies are exogenous
with a fixed fraction of innovators and imitators. We consider three cases: in Section
4.1 all firms engage in in-house R&D, in Section 4.2 all firms try to imitate and in Sec-
tion 4.3 some firms always do in-house R&D, while others always imitate. We are not
interested per se in these environments. However, they provide a useful contrast with
(and intuition for) the results of Section 5, where firms choose optimally between in-
house R&D and imitation, and where we present the main contribution of the paper.
The reader who is more interested in the productivity dynamics with endogenous inno-
vation choice might however skip these sections and start directly with Section 5.
4.1. Innovation Only
Assume that all firms do in-house R&D, or equivalently that firms have no absorptive
capacity for imitation (q = 0). Innovation is assumed to yield a stochastic return and to
have an incremental step-by-step nature. Namely, a firm engaging in R&D either moves
one step upwards in the productivity ladder or experiences no productivity change.11
The probability of success is given by p > 0, assumed to be independent of the firm’s
initial productivity. More formally, we can write the transition matrix due to in-house
11The assumption of step-by-step innovation is for simplicity. In the working paper version [Ko¨nig
et al., 2012], we consider a more general formulation where firms doing R&D face a positive probability
of making 0, 1, 2, ...,m steps forward, where m < ∞.
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R&D as:
Tin =


1− p p 0 . . . 0 . . .
0 1− p p 0 . . . 0
0 0 1− p p 0 . . .
...
...
. . . . . . . . . . . .

 .
From Proposition 1 it follows that, as N → ∞, the evolution of the log-productivity
distribution in Equation (8) follows the ODE ∂P(t)∂t = P(t)(T
in − I). This is a diffusion
equation with a positive drift. The central limit theorem implies then that the log-
productivity approaches a Gaussian shape as t grows. Both the mean and the variance
rise linearly with t, as stated more formally by the following proposition.
Proposition 2. Assume q = 0 and p > 0. Then, for large N, the log-productivity distribution
approaches a normal distribution N (tp, tp (1− p)), for large t. The productivity distribution
converges to a log-normal distribution with mean µA = e
tp(1+ 12 (1−p)) and variance σ2A =(
etp(1−p) − 1
)
e2tp+tp(1−p).
4.2. Imitation Only
Next, we consider the polar opposite case in which firms have no capacity to innovate
through in-house R&D, and can progress only by imitating other firms’ technologies.
More formally, we assume q > 0 and p = 0. The long-run outcome is easy to guess: all
firms will converge to the same productivity level, equal to the largest productivity in
the initial distribution. In spite of this counterfactual implication, this is an instructive
warm-up case, as it provides key insights for our main result.
The probability that a firm with log-productivity a attains through imitation a log-
productivity b > a is given by
Timab (P) = q
b−aPb + qb−a(1− q)Pb+1 + qb−a(1− q)Pb+2 + . . .
= qb−a
(
Pb + (1− q)
∞
∑
k=1
Pb+k
)
= qb−a (Pb + (1− q)(1− Fb)) , (9)
where F is the cumulative distribution of P, Fb = ∑
b
c=1 Pc. The first term in the sum
corresponds to a firm with log-productivity a being matched with a firm with log-
productivity b > a and climbing up successfully all the b − a rungs. This happens
with probability qb−a. The second term describes the case in which the firm is matched
with a firm with log-productivity b+ 1, but climbs only b− a rungs, failing to climb the
last rung. And so on. See also Figure 3. If b < a, the firm has nothing to imitate, thus
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Timab (P) = 0. The probability for the firm not to make any improvement is, therefore,
Timaa (P) = 1−∑b>a Timab (P).
The transition matrix Tim with elements given by Equation (9) is “interactive” and is
given by:12
Tim(P) =


S1(P) q(P2 + (1− q)(1− F2)) q2(P3 + (1− q)(1− F3)) . . .
0 S2(P) q(P3 + (1− q)(1− F3)) . . .
0 0 S3(P)
. . .
...
...
. . . . . .

 ,
where Sa(P) ≡ 1−∑∞b=a+1Timab (P) = 1−∑∞b=a+1 qb−a (Pb + (1− q)(1− Fb)). In the case
of q = 1, which will be the benchmark of our analysis below, this simplifies to Sa(P) =
Fa. In accordance with Proposition 1, for large N, the evolution of the log-productivity
distribution is given by
∂P(t)
∂t
= P(t)(Tim(P(t)) − I). (10)
From Equation (10) we can derive a system of differential equations governing the evo-
lution of the cumulative log-productivity distribution.
Proposition 3. Assume q > 0 and p = 0. Then, for large N, the evolution of the cumulative
log-productivity distribution F(t) is given by
∂Fa(t)
∂t
= Fa(t)
2 − Fa(t) + (1− q)(1− Fa(t))
a−1
∑
b=0
qbFa−b(t), a ∈ S , (11)
for some initial distribution F(0) : S → [0, 1] with finite support. Then there exists a maximal
initial log-productivity am such that Fa(0) = 1 for all a ≥ am, and as t → ∞, the distribution
converges to:
lim
t→∞ Fa(t) =
{
0, if a < am,
1, if a ≥ am.
(12)
i.e., limt→∞ Pam(t) = 1
In the special case of q = 1, we recover the knowledge growth dynamics analyzed by
Lucas [2008].
4.3. Innovation and Imitation
Consider, next, the evolution of the productivity distribution in a world where inno-
vation strategies are exogenous, i.e., N1 firms do in-house R&D while N2 = N − N1
12AMarkov chain is interactive if the transition probabilities depend on the current distribution [Con-
lisk, 1976].
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firms imitate, where N1 ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,N}. In this case, the dynamics of the productivity
frontier is governed by the firms engaged in in-house R&D. The resulting evolution of
the productivity distribution is as analyzed in Section 4.1.13 There we show that the
productivity distribution of firms doing R&D converges to a log-normal distribution
with an ever increasing variance (see Proposition 2). Since the proportion of innovators
and imitators is fixed, this implies that also the variance of the distribution of the total
population of firms must diverge.14 Since the empirical evidence discussed in the in-
troduction (cf. Figure 1) suggests that there is no such increase in the variance of the
distribution, a model with an exogenous proportion of innovators and imitators yields
counterfactual predictions.
5. Endogenous Choice of the Innovation Strategy
This section contains the main result of the paper. We assume that firms choose whether
to innovate through in-house R&D or to imitate other firms based on a standard value-
maximization objective. In our environment, this is equivalent to maximizing the ex-
pected profit in every period. In turn, Equation (1) shows that the profit is linearly
increasing in the technology level. Thus, profit-maximizing firms endeavor simply to
maximize the expected level of technology every period.15 The intuitive reason for this
equivalence is that there are no sunk costs: The opportunity cost of innovation is the
return from imitation, and vice versa, and firms can switch back-and-forth between in-
novation and imitation with no adjustment cost. Hence, forward-looking firms simply
choose the strategy (either in-house R&D or innovation) so as to maximize the expected
number of improvements along the quality ladder.
Let Eini [Ai(t+ ∆t)| Ai(t)] and Eimi [Ai(t+ ∆t)| Ai(t), P(t)] denote the expected pro-
ductivity for a firm whose current productivity is Ai (t), conditional on choosing in-
house R&D and imitation, respectively. Recall that expected profits are proportional to
expected productivities (see Equation (1) in Section 2.1). Thus, the profit-maximizing
firm i chooses in-house R&D whenever
E
in
i [Ai(t+ ∆t)| Ai (t)] > Eimi [Ai(t+ ∆t)| Ai (t) , P(t)] , (13)
13A more formal analysis of the case in which there are both innovators and imitators is provided in
Appendix A.1.
14In particular, there is divergence in the sub-population of firms carrying out R&D, as these do not
benefit from the spillover associated with the progress in the frontier technology. It is possible to char-
acterize the dynamics of the cumulative log -productivity distribution in terms of a differential equation,
although this admits no closed-form solution. The analysis is deferred to Appendix A.1.
15For a formal proof, see Proposition 8 in Appendix A.2, showing that the firm’s value function is
increasing in its technology level.
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where the expected productivity from innovation is given by
E
in
i [Ai(t+ ∆t)| Ai(t)] = Ai(t) ((1− p) + pA¯) ,
while the expected productivity from imitation is
E
im
i [Ai(t+ ∆t)| Ai (t) , P(t)]
= Ai(t)

Sai(t)P(t) + ∞∑
b=ai(t)+1
A¯b−ai(t)qb−ai(t) (Pb(t) + (1− q)(1− Fb(t)))

 ,
and Sa(P) = 1−∑∞b=a+1Timab (P), as defined in Section 4.2. The decision rule in Equation
(13) can alternatively be captured by the following indicator function:
χim(ai(t), P(t)) =

1 if a
im
i (ai(t), P(t)) ≥ aini (ai(t)),
0 otherwise,
(14)
where aini (ai(t)) ≡ logEini [Ai(t+ ∆t)| Ai(t)], and aimi (ai(t), P(t)) ≡ log Aimi (Ai(t), P(t)).
In words, χim(ai(t), P(t)) ∈ {0, 1} is the indicator variable being one if firm i pursues
imitation, and zero if the firm pursues in-house R&D. Similarly, we define χin(ai(t), P(t)) ≡
1− χim(ai(t), P(t)).
To achieve a complete analytical characterization, in the rest of this section we restrict
our attention to economies in which firms have no absorptive capacity limits, q = 1. We
shall return to the more general case in Section 6.
Proposition 4. Assume that q = 1. Then for any P there exists a unique threshold log-
productivity a∗ (P) ∈ S such that: (i) χim(a, P) = 1 (and χin(a, P) = 0) for a ≤ a∗ (P)
and (ii) χim(a, P) = 0 (and χin(a, P) = 1) for a > a∗ (P).
Proposition 4 establishes that the decision about the innovation strategy has a thresh-
old property: relatively backward firms (i.e., those weakly below the threshold a∗ (P))
optimally choose to imitate, while more advanced firms (i.e., those above the threshold
a∗ (P)) choose to innovate.
We now turn to the equilibrium dynamics. The transition matrix T(P) is the sum
of the transition matrices for innovation and imitation given in Sections 4.1 and 4.2, re-
spectively, each weighted by the respective indicator function from Equation (14). The
equilibrium dynamics of the log-productivity distribution can be represented by the
differential inclusion in Equation (7) in Proposition 1. However, it is not possible to ex-
press the equilibrium dynamics in terms of the ODE (8). The reason is that whenever
aini (a
∗ (P)) = aimi (a
∗ (P) , P) , i.e., firms at the productivity level a∗ are indifferent be-
tween in-house R&D and imitation, the indicator function χim (a∗ (P) , P) is discontinu-
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ous in P. This violates the standard continuity condition under which we can represent
the dynamics as an ODE. Since proving our main result using the theory of differen-
tial inclusions would be more involved, we roundabout this technical complication by
replacing the discontinuous indicator function by a continuous approximation. This al-
lows us to the express the equilibrium dynamics in terms of an ODE (see Equation (16)
below). More formally, we define the continuous logistic function,
χimβ (ai(t), P(t)) =
1
1+ e−β(aimi (ai(t),P(t))−aini (ai(t)))
, (15)
with the property that limβ→∞ χimβ (ai(t), P(t)) = χ
im(ai(t), P(t)). For large β, we then
have that χimβ (ai(t), P(t)) ≈ χim(ai(t), P(t)). In the working paper version [Ko¨nig et al.,
2012], we propose an explicit micro-foundation for such a formulation, whereby firms
are subject to stochastic shocks affecting their productivity in performing in-house R&D,
and these shocks then create a time-varying comparative advantage for different firms.
Replacing χim by χimβ , and assuming a large population of firms (N → ∞) allows us
write the evolution of the log-productivity distribution as follows:16
∂P(t)
∂t
= P(t) (T(P)− I) = P(t)
(
(I−D (P))Tin +D(P)Tim(P)− I
)
, (16)
for some initial distribution P(0) : S → [0, 1], where D(P) denotes the diagonal matrix
with diagonal elements given by χimβ (a, P) for all a ∈ S . Making explicit the individual
equation for each relative frequency, Pa, yields:
∂Pa(t)
∂t
= Pa(t)
(
a−1
∑
b=1
χimβ (b, P)Pb(t) + χ
im
β (a, P)Sa(P)
)
+ (1− p)Pa(t)
(
1− χim(a, P)
)
+ pPa−1(t)
(
1− χimβ (a− 1, P)
)
− Pa(t), a ∈ S . (17)
The system of ODEs in (17), expressed in terms of Pa, can be turned into a system of
ODEs in terms of the complementary cumulative productivity distribution, Ga(t) =
1− Fa(t), as indicated in the following proposition:
Proposition 5. Assume a large population of firms with unlimited absorptive capacity limits
(q = 1). Let the decision rule χim (ai(t), P(t)) be approximated by the continuous (logistic)
function χimβ (ai(t), P(t)) given by Equation (15). Then, in the limit of β → ∞, for all a ∈ S ,
16Note that this representation is legitimate for an β < ∞, although later we will focus on the limit in
which β→ ∞, which is the economically interesting case. See also Section 7 for further discussion.
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the dynamics of the cumulative log-productivity distribution is
∂Ga(t)
∂t
=
{
Ga(t)− Ga(t)2, if a ≤ a∗(P),
(1− G⌊a∗(t)⌋(t))Ga(t)− p(Ga(t)− Ga−1(t)), if a > a∗(P).
(18)
The system of ODEs (18) can be solved numerically subject to the boundary condi-
tions lima→∞ Ga(t) = 0 and lima→1 Ga(t) = 1. More interestingly, it is possible to char-
acterize analytically a steady-state distribution consistent with Equation (18).17 Contrary
to the case in which firms are assigned exogenously to in-house R&D and innovation,
and consistently with the empirical evidence, this distribution has a constant variance.
Moreover, contrary to the case of pure imitation this productivity distribution grows
over time at a constant rate. Next, we provide a formal definition of a traveling wave:
Definition 1. The log-productivity distribution Ga(t) is a traveling wave, if it is of the form
Ga(t) = g(a − νt) for some non-increasing function g : R → [0, 1], where ν ≥ 0 is the
traveling wave velocity.
Note that Definition 1 implies that a traveling wave has the property that Ga(t) =
Ga+νs(t + s) for any s ≥ 0. The following proposition shows that a traveling wave
with two exponential tails is a solution for the log-productivity distribution satisfying
Equation (18).
Proposition 6. A function g : R → [0, 1] and a traveling wave velocity ν ≥ 0 exist such that
a traveling wave Ga(t) = g(a− νt) is a steady-state solution of Equation (18), with a threshold
given by a∗(t) = a∗0 + νt, for a constant a∗0 determined by the initial condition, a∗0 = a∗(0).
The shape of the traveling wave for a ≤ a∗ (t) is
Ga(t) =
1
1+
(
1
g0
− 1
)
e
a−a∗0−νt
ν
, (19)
with g0 = g(0). For a > a
∗ (t) there exists a p∗ > 0 such that for all 0 < p < p∗ the two
inequalities
∞
∑
k=−∞
cke
−λk(a−νt) ≤ Ga(t) ≤
∞
∑
k=−∞
cke
−λk(a−νt), (20)
hold with appropriate constants ck, ck, and exponents λk, λk having strictly positive real parts.
Consequently, the following asymptotic results hold for the associated probability mass function
17By a steady-state distribution, we mean a distribution whose shape is preserved over time, up to
changes in its mean. See the more formal definition of a traveling wave in Definition 1.
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Pa(t) = Ga−1(t)− Ga(t),18
Pa(t) =
{
e
a−νt
ν + o(1), if a ≪ a∗ (t) ,
O
(
e−λ0(a−νt)
)
, if a ≫ a∗ (t) . (21)
The first part of the proposition establishes that, if the log-productivity distribu-
tion follows the equilibrium law of motion dictated by Equation (17) (or, identically,
by Equation (18)), then in the stationary state, the distribution reproduces itself over
time, up to a trend in a∗ (t) whose growth is pinned down by ν.19 The distribution is
a traveling wave with velocity ν, i.e. a distribution whose second and higher moments
remain constant over time.
Observe that the second part of Proposition 6 requires that the in-house R&D success
probability p is bounded from above. While this assumption is necessary for the proof
of this part of the proposition, in all the numerical simulations shown in the following
sections we did not find a departure of the exponential decay of the right tail of the
distribution.
For a ≤ a∗ (t) in Equation (19) we can provide an exact characterization of the solu-
tion of Equation (18), while above the threshold in Equation (20) we can only provide
a lower and an upper bound to the exact solution. This is because the second part of
Equation (18) (for a > a∗ (t)) is more complicated to analyze. To see this, note that
the mass of firms with log-productivity a below the threshold a∗(t) can only change
through imitation of firms with higher log-productivities, where the mass of such firms
is given by Ga(t). In contrast, the change in the mass of firms above the threshold has
two different components: First, it can change due to productivity gains from innova-
tion, which are determined by the innovation success probability p. Second, there is
an influx of imitating firms which become innovating firms in the next period, and in
every period the mass of these imitating firms is given by F⌊a∗(t)⌋(t) = 1− G⌊a∗(t)⌋(t).
This is why G⌊a∗(t)⌋(t) appears only in the second part of Equation (18), and because of
these two components and the term proportional to G⌊a∗(t)⌋(t) this part of Equation (18)
is more difficult to analyze.
The bounds in Equation (20) for values of the log-productivity above the threshold
a∗(t) exploit recent results in the mathematics literature for the analysis of so called
Delay Differential Equations (DDE) [cf. Bellman and Cooke, 1963; Driver, 1977; Smith,
2010], showing that the solutions to such DDE can be written as a linear combination
18 We define g(x) = O( f (x)) if and only if |g(x)/ f (x)| is bounded from above by a constant (which in
our case is one) as x → ∞. Moreover, g(x) = o( f (x)) if and only if g(x)/ f (x)→ 0 as x → ∞, and g(x) ∼
f (x) if and only if g(x)/ f (x)→ 1 as x → ∞. The latter can also be written as g(x) = f (x) + o( f (x)).
19Note that a∗(t) in Proposition 6 can be related to the cutoff a∗(P) by using the floor function, where
a∗(P(t)) = ⌊a∗0 + νt⌋ = ⌊a∗(t)⌋, that is, the largest integer no greater than the threshold a∗(t).
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of exponential functions [cf. Asl and Ulsoy, 2003; Yi and Ulsoy, 2006]. More precisely,
one can show that due to the appearance of the term G⌊a∗(t)⌋(t) in the second part of
Equation (18) we need to solve a linear DDE with non-constant coefficients. We can,
however, establish upper and lower bounds to the solution to this equation which are
themselves solutions to linear DDEs with constant coefficients. Asl and Ulsoy [2003]
have shown that the latter can be expressed as sums of exponential functions with well
defined exponents. For log-productivities far above the threshold only the dominating
exponential terms in these sums remain, and so they provide exponential upper and
lower bounds for the tail of the distribution. The details (including a more explicit
characterization of the constants ck, ck, and exponents λk, λk) can be found in the proof
of Proposition 6 in Appendix A.3.
The productivity distribution characterized by Equations (19) and (20) features both
a right-hand and a left-hand power-law tail, similar to what we observe in the data (see
Figure 1).20 More precisely, the lower tail of the distribution follows immediately from
the logistic expression in Equation (19); the upper tail of the distribution corresponds
to the approximation of the sum ∑∞k=−∞ cke−λk(a−νt) in the lower bound of Equation
(20) where only the term for k = 0 is retained, whereas all other terms of the sequence
become negligible when a is far above the threshold a∗ (t), and the upper and lower
bounds in Equation (20) get arbitrarily close to each other. A numerical analysis of the
solution shows that only a few terms in the sum are sufficient to obtain a good approx-
imation of the whole stationary distribution.21,22 Moreover, even considering only the
dominant exponent (i.e., λ0) in the lower bound in Equation (20) yields a fairly accurate
approximation. In this case, the solution becomes very simple: λ0 turns out to be the
unique root of the following transcendental equation23
(e− 1)eλ0(λ0 − 1)− (A¯− 1)e1−λ0(1+ λ0) + A¯+ e− 2−
e− 1
p
= 0, (22)
while the traveling wave velocity ν is given by
ν =
1
λ0
(
1+ p(eλ0 − 1)− p(A¯− 1)(1− e
1−λ0)
e− 1
)
. (23)
20Note that Pa(t) ∝ e−λa = e−λ log A = A−λ.
21Figure A.3 in Appendix A.3 compares the solution obtained from a direct numerical integration of
Equation (18) with that obtained from the analytical solution of Equations (19) and (20), after truncating
the sequence of exponents λk to k ∈ {0,−1}. The numerical solution is very well approximated over the
entire support, nor would additional terms alter the distribution in any visible way.
22The Lambert function has always at most two real roots, corresponding in our notation to k = 0 (the
“dominant root”) and k = −1. See e.g. Asl and Ulsoy [2003]; Corless et al. [1996].
23The details of this derivation can be found in Remark 3 in Appendix A.3.
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Figure 4: Examples of numerical solutions of the system of ODEs in Equation (16) with different initial
conditions (color online). In all cases, we set p = 0.1, q = 1 and log A¯ = 1, yielding λ = 2.1 (cf. Equation
(22)). The top left panel shows the traveling wave with an exponential decay with λ = 2.1. The other
three panels show the transition from different initial conditions. The top right panel shows an initial
distribution decaying exponentially with an exponent λ = 5. The tail of the distribution increases until it
reaches the stationary value of λ = 2.1, as in the top left panel. The bottom left panel shows the transition
from a uniform initial distribution on the interval [0, 1]. The bottom right panel shows the transition from
a Poisson initial distribution with parameter 3. In all cases, the distribution converges to the traveling
wave in the top left panel.
Proposition 6 yields an existence result: a traveling wave with an associated particular
probability mass function is a steady-state solution for the log-productivity distribu-
tion.24 For other initial distributions different from the steady-state distribution there
will be transitional dynamics. We are unable to establish formal conditions that guaran-
tee that the distribution converges to the traveling wave in Proposition 6. However, we
have obtained convergence in numerically computed solutions of the system of ODEs
in Equation (18) with a variety of initial distributions. Figure 4 shows three such cases
(color online). The top left panel shows, for reference, a simulation in which the initial
condition is consistent with the steady-state distribution – no transitional dynamics.25
The top-right panel considers an initial exponential distribution with a steeper tail
than in Equations (19) and (20). As the figure shows, the tail of the distribution in-
creases during the transition. The bottom left panel shows the case of a uniform initial
24However, we are unable to make any claim about the uniqueness of the steady-state distribution.
Luttmer [2012] proves uniqueness in a related setup. However, the model is different, and it is not clear
whether similar techniques can be extended to our framework.
25Note that the imitation-innovation threshold lies to the right of the maximum of the distribution.
In the region around the maximum firms imitate and the distribution is characterized by the logistic
expression
(
1+
(
1
g0
− 1
)
e
a−a∗0−νt
ν
)−1
. In the region where firms innovate, the log-productivity is well
approximated by an exponentially decaying function.
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Figure 5: Examples of numerical solutions of the system of ODEs in Equation (16) with different values
of q (color online). In all cases we set log A¯ = 1 and p = 0.1. The top left panel shows an economy where
growth is driven by innovation only (q = 0). The top right panel shows the case in which p = q = 0.1.
The bottom panels show, respectively, the case of q = 0.2 and q = 0.5.
distribution. Finally, the bottom right panel shows a simulation starting from a Poisson
distribution. In all cases, the distributions converge to the stationary distribution shown
in the top left panel.26
6. Limited Absorptive Capacity
In this section we consider the more general model in which firms have a limited abil-
ity to absorb other firms’ technologies. We are motivated by the observation that the
steady-state distribution characterized in Proposition 6 fits the data well in a qualitative
but not in a quantitative sense. Intuitively, if one calibrates the key parameter of the
model, p, to fit the tails of the empirical distribution in Figure 1 (and, in particular, to fit
the variance of the distribution), the model overpredicts the growth rate. The intuitive
reason is that the convergence rate of imitating firms is too high. Then, in order to fit the
spread of the distribution one must increase the rate of success of innovation, inducing
fast growth. Alternatively, if one targets the growth rate by setting a lower value of p,
the model yields too low a variance.27
To address this quantitative failure, we extend the model to allow for q ≤ 1. The
analysis of the case in which q < 1 can only be done with the aid of numerical methods
(i.e., by numerical integration of Equation (17)). Figure 5 shows numerically computed
26The code can be obtained upon request from the authors.
27Recall from our discussion in Section 4.2 that in the extreme case of p→ 0 the distribution shrinks to
a degenerate distribution with mass one localized at the highest initial productivity value.
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solutions of the system of ODEs in Equation (17) for a probability of success of inno-
vation p = 0.1 (color online). The figure shows four cases corresponding to different
values of q.28 As shown more formally in the analysis of Section 4, the solution in the
case without imitation, q = 0, features a log-normal shape (i.e., a parabola in the semi-
log plot) with a growing variance over time (see top left panel). The same qualitative
property extends to the case of q = p, i.e., when a step of imitation is as likely as a step
of innovation (q = p). However, for q sufficiently large the distribution converges to a
traveling wave with stable exponential tails. This is clearly visible in the bottom right
panel, where the exponential tails are straight lines in the logarithmic scale of the plot.29
Hence, our analysis suggests that a value of q considerably larger than p is necessary to
match the data in Figure 1.
Next, we calibrate the parameters of our model to match the empirical productivity
distribution. The details of our calibration procedure are in Online Appendix B.3. The
best match is obtained by setting p = 0.0049 and q = 0.106. Figure 6 (color online)
displays a comparison of the empirical distributions with the calibrated model for the
years 1995, 1999 and 2003 is displayed in . The comparison between the simulated and
the empirical distributions show that the model can reproduce the observed pattern
well.
7. Noisy Choice of Innovation and Imitation
In this section, we generalize the results of Section 5 to the case in which the noise in
the firm’s choice of innovation strategy is non-infinitesimal (cf. Equation (15)). The
main goal of this extension is to provide a robust intuition for the driving force behind
the emergence of a traveling wave. We show, in particular, that the optimal choice of
innovation and imitation, is not essential. Rather, the traveling wave emerges whenever
the model features a stochastic switching of firms between innovation and imitation
strategies.30
We assume that the probability that a firm with log-productivity ai(t) pursues imi-
tation is given by Equation (15). The decision rule in Equation (15) can be motivated by
assuming that firms’ profits from in-house R&D are exposed to stochastic shocks (see
the accompanying working paper, Ko¨nig et al. [2012], for further details), while the lim-
28All computations started with the initial distribution P(0) = (1, 0, . . . , 0) and levels of log-
productivity ranging over a = 1, . . . , 50. Twenty time steps are shown (t = 55, +5. . ., 150 in colors from
blue to red in Figure 5).
29Additional numerical analysis suggests that such traveling waves with exponential tails also emerge
for lower innovation probabilities whenever q ≥ 5p.
30We would like to thank the Editor for pointing this out.
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Figure 6: Comparison of the empirical distributions of Figure 1 with the calibrated model (p = 0.0049
and q = 0.106) for the years 1995, 1999 and 2003 (color online). The empirical productivity values have
been binned to produce the histogram shown in the figure, using 11 bins across all observed productivity
values.
iting case in which β → ∞ is analyzed in Section 5. Allowing for non-negligible noise
has no major qualitative implications. Since the innovation strategy is chosen less and
less efficiently as we decrease β, the model predicts a lower productivity growth rate.
While the general case can only be analyzed numerically, analytical results can be ob-
tained for the polar case in which we let β → 0. This yields χimβ (a, P) → 0.5, namely,
every firm chooses randomly between imitation and in-house R&D, irrespective of a
and P.31
Setting χimβ (b, P) = 0.5 in Equation (17) and summing over a yields the equilibrium
dynamics governed by the following system of ODEs:
∂Fa(t)
∂t
=
1
2
(Fa(t)
2 − Fa(t))− p
2
(Fa(t)− Fa−1(t)) , (24)
for all a ∈ S . The next proposition establishes that there exists a traveling wave solution
to Equation (24).
Proposition 7. Let Fa(t) be a solution of Equation (24) with a Heaviside initial distribution
Fa(0) = Θ(a − am) for some am ≥ 1 and define mǫ(t) = inf{a : Fa(t) > ǫ}. Then
limt→∞ mǫ(t)t = ν, for some constant ν ≥ 0, and Fa(t) is a traveling wave of the form Fa(t) =
f (a− νt) for some non-decreasing function f : R+ → [0, 1].
In addition, one can show that the limiting log-productivity distribution decays ex-
31This model is similar to the one analyzed in Majumdar and Krapivsky [2001].
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Figure 7: Examples of numerical solutions of the system of ODEs in Equation (24) with β = 0 (random
choice of imitation vs- in-house R&D), given different initial conditions (color online). In all cases, we set
p = 0.1, q = 1 and log A¯ = 1. The initial conditions are the same as in Figure 5. In all cases, we observe
the transition to a traveling wave with a stable shape.
ponentially in the tails, similar to what we have found in Proposition 6.32 Figure 7 (color
online) illustrates examples of numerically computed solutions of the system of ODEs
in Equation (24) for p = 0.1, q = 1 and log A¯ = 1, showing the transition from the same
initial conditions as in Figure 5 to a traveling wave with stable shape. We observe that
the distribution moves more slowly to the right than in Figure 5 due to the suboptimal
random mixing between in-house R&D and imitation.
While we do not view a model in which firms choose their innovation strategy ran-
domly as particularly appealing, its analysis yields interesting insights about the for-
mal properties of the model. In particular, the existence of a traveling wave contrasts
sharply with the result of the model in Section 4 where a fixed number of firms imitate
and the rest do in-house R&D. In that model, the variance of productivity grows over
time, whereas in the model of this section the variance does not blow up – despite the
fact that in both cases the proportion of innovators and imitators is assumed to be con-
stant. The key difference is that in the case of deterministic innovation strategies the
variance increases over time within the population of in-house innovators which are
permanently barred from the spillovers. In this sections’s model, in contrast, even firms
failing repeatedly to innovate through in-house R&D are assigned, sooner or later, to im-
itation. When this happens, they can benefit from the productivity spillovers generated
by successful firms. The fact that laggard innovators switch with positive probability
into imitation, prevents the emergence of an ever growing tail of the distribution.
32The proof is available upon request.
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In conclusion, it is not per se the optimal choice of innovation vs. imitation that
yields a stable distribution. What matters is productivity spillovers coupled with the
assumption that all firms can benefit from them with a positive probability. The profit-
maximizing behavior of firms is a particular case of this model featuring an efficient
sorting of firms into the two strategies.
8. Conclusion
In this paper we have introduced a model of endogenous technological change, produc-
tivity growth, and technology spillovers that is consistent with empirically observed
productivity distributions. The innovation process is governed by a combined process
of firms’ in-house R&D activities and adoption of other firms’ existing technologies. The
emerging productivity distributions can be described as traveling waves with a constant
shape and power-law tails, matching the empirically observed distributions.
The current model can be extended in a number of directions. We sketch three ex-
tensions in the online Appendix B.1. First, we outline a model of productivity growth
and technology adoption which includes the possibility that a firm’s productivity may
also be reduced due to exogenous events such as the expiration of a patent. Second, we
allow for entry and exit. Third, we consider an alternative model of capacity constraints
in the ability of firms to adopt and imitate external knowledge, whereby below a rela-
tive productivity threshold firms become unable to imitate. In this case, the model can
generate “convergence clubs” such as those documented in empirical studies of cross-
country income differences [e.g. Durlauf and Johnson, 1995; Feyrer, 2008; Quah, 1997].
Finally, one could extend our framework by introducing heterogeneous interactions
in the form of a network in the imitation process and analyze the emerging productivity
distributions, such as in DiMatteo et al. [2005]; Ehrhardt et al. [2006]; Kelly [2001]; Ko¨nig
[2011]. We leave this avenue for future research.
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Appendix
A. Additional Results
A.1. Analysis of Section 4.3: Exogenous Innovation Strategies
In Section 4.3 we consider a model in which the innovation strategy (either in-house
R&D or imitation) is a fixed characteristic of firms. We state that in this case the pro-
ductivity distribution has an ever increasing variance. In this appendix we provide the
details of the analysis. In particular, in Equation (26) below we provide a differential
equation completely characterizing the dynamics of the log-productivity distribution.
Denote by P
(1)
a (t) the fraction of innovators (with a total of N1 innovators) with log-
productivity a at time t and similarly denote by P
(2)
a (t) the fraction of imitators (with a
total of N2 imitators) with log-productivity a at time t. The total fraction of firms with
log-productivity a at time t can then be written as
Pa(t) =
N1P
(1)
a (t) + N2P
(2)
a (t)
N1 + N2
= n1P
(1)
a (t) + n2P
(2)
a (t),
where we have introduced the population shares of innovators n1 = N1/N and imita-
tors n2 = N2/N with N = N1 + N2. The evolution of the log-productivity distribution
P(1)(t) of innovating firms is independent of the imitating firms and, by virtue of Propo-
sition 1, it is given by (see also Section 4.1)
∂P(1)(t)
∂t
= P(1)(t)(Tin − I).
Thus, the variance of the distribution increases over time.
For completeness, we also characterize the evolution of the log-productivity distri-
bution P
(2)
a (t) of imitating firms. This is given by (see also Section 4.2)
∂P
(2)
a (t)
∂t
= Pa(t)
a
∑
b=1
P
(2)
b (t)− P(2)a (t)
(
1−
a−1
∑
b=1
Pb(t)
)
. (25)
The first term in the above equation takes into account the fraction of imitating firms
with log-productivities smaller or equal to a that imitate a firm with log-productivity
a. The second term considers the imitating firms with log-productivity a that imitate a
firm with log-productivity larger than a. This is equivalent to the residual firms that fail
to imitate a firm with log-productivity larger than a.
Summing over a, and rearranging terms, one can then derive from Equation (25) the
dynamics of the cumulative log-productivity distribution Fa(t), which is given by
∂Fa(t)
∂t
= Fa(t)
2 − Fa(t)− n1F(1)a (t)Fa(t) + n1F(1)a (t)− n1pP(1)a (t). (26)
Given the solution for P
(1)
a (t) (and F
(1)
a (t), respectively) and a fixed value of a, Equa-
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tion (26) is a Riccati first-order, linear differential equation with non-constant, nonlinear
coefficients, for which no closed form solution exists.33
A.2. Analysis of Section 5: The Dynamic Problem of the Firm
In the text we state that when a firm maximizes its expected productivity increase, it
also maximizes its present value. Thus, the static optimization studied in the text is
equivalent to a dynamic value maximization problem. We consider for simplicity time
increments of ∆t = 1. The dynamic problem of the firm is then given by
V0(Ai(0), P(0)) = max
(si(t)∈{im,in})T−1t=0
E
[
T−1
∑
t=0
δtπ
si(t)
i (t)
∣∣∣∣∣ Ai(0), P(0)
]
,
where π
si(t)
i (t) = ψAi(t)A¯
ϑsi(t) is the per period profit of firm i choosing the R&D strat-
egy si(t) ∈ {im, in}, ϑsi(t) are the random increments along the quality ladder under
strategy si(t) and δ is a discount factor. The corresponding Bellman equation is given
by
Vt(Ai(t), P(t)) = max
si∈{im,in}
{
ψAi(t)E
[
A¯ϑsi
∣∣∣ Ai(t), P(t)]
+δ E
[
Vt+1(Ai(t)A¯
ϑsi , P(t+ 1))
∣∣∣ Ai(t), P(t)]} .
This can be written as follows
Vt(Ai(t), P(t)) = max
{∫
dFin(ϑ)
(
ψAi(t)A¯
ϑ + δVt+1(Ai(t)A¯
ϑ, P(t+ 1))
)
,
∫
dFim(ϑ|Ai(t), P(t))
(
ψAi(t)A¯
ϑ + δVt+1(Ai(t)A¯
ϑ , P(t+ 1))
)}
. (27)
Similar to Theorem 1 in Lippman and McCall [1976], we can state the following lemma:
Lemma 1. The value function Vt(Ai(t), P(t)) of Equation (27) is increasing in the productivity
of firm i, Ai(t), for all i = 1, . . . , n and t ≥ 0.
With the above lemma we are now able to state the following proposition.
Proposition 8. Consider the value function of Equation (27). Then for each period t it is opti-
mal for firm i to choose the strategy si(t) ∈ {im, in} which gives it the highest expected produc-
tivity in that period.
33For a fixed log-productivity a, denote by y(t) = Fa(t). Then one can write from Equation (26) the
following differential equation
dy(t)
dt + ay(t)
2 + b(t)y(t) = c(t), where a = −1, b(t) = 1+ n1F(1)a (t) and
c(t) = n1(F
(1)
a (t)− pP(1)a (t)).
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A.3. Proofs of Propositions and Lemmas
In this section, we provide a formal proof of the Propositions and Lemmas in the text.
It is convenient to introduce the random variable ζNP whose distribution describes the
stochastic increments of (PN(t))t∈T from the state P ∈ PN
P
(
ζNP = z
)
= P
(
PN (t+ ∆t) = P+ z
∣∣∣ PN (t) = P) .
Moreover, following the notation in Sandholm [2010, Chap.10.2] we introduce the func-
tions VN, AN and ANδ by
VN(P) ≡ NE[ζNP ],
AN(P) ≡ NE[|ζNP |],
ANδ (P) ≡ NE[
∣∣∣ζNP I{|ζNP |>δ}
∣∣∣].
We then can state the following lemma:
Lemma 2. Consider some sequence (δN)∞N=N0 with limN→∞ δ
N = 0, then we have that
(i) limN→∞ supP∈PN
∣∣VN(P)−V(P)∣∣ = 0,
(ii) supN supP∈PN A
N(P) < ∞, and
(iii) limN→∞ supP∈PN A
N
δN
(P) = 0,
PROOF OF LEMMA 2. In the following we prove that the conditions (i) to (iii). First,
observe that
VN(P) = NE[ζNP ]
= N ∑
a,b≥1
1
N
(eb − ea)P
(
ζNP =
1
N
(eb − ea)
)
= N ∑
a,b≥1
1
N
(eb − ea)PaTab(P)
= ∑
a≥1
ea
(
∑
b≥1
PbTba(P)− Pa ∑
b≥1
Tab(P)
)
= ∑
a≥1
eaVa(P) = V(P)
which is independent of N. This implies that condition (i) is satisfied. Further, observe
that since |ea − eb| =
√
2 for a 6= b and 0 otherwise, (PN(t))t∈T has jumps of at most√
2/N. Hence, for δN =
√
2/N
ANδN(P) = NE
[∣∣∣ζNP I{|ζNP |>√2/N}
∣∣∣] = 0,
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and condition (iii) holds. Finally, we find that
AN(P) = NE[|ζNP |] ≤ N
√
2
N
=
√
2 < ∞,
and also condition (ii) is satisfied. ✷
We now can give the proof of Proposition 1.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1. Note that the indicator function for imitation χim(a, P) of
Equation (14) has a point of discontinuity at the threshold log-productivity a∗, and so
does V(P) = T(P)− I. Let ‖P‖ denote the L2 norm in R|S|+ . Define
V¯(P) =
⋂
ǫ>0
cl
(
conv
(
V
(
{P′ ∈ RS+ : ‖P− P′‖ ≤ ǫ}
)))
(28)
as the closed convex hull of all values of V that obtain vectors P′ arbitrarily close to P.
We then can state the following theorem [Gast and Gaujal, 2010]:34,35
Theorem 1. Let V¯(P) be upper semi-continuous and assume that there exists an c > 0 such
that ‖V¯(P)‖ ≤ c. Then for all T > 0
inf
P∈DT(P(0))
sup
0≤t≤T
‖PN(t)− P(t)‖ p−→ 0,
where P(t) is a solution of the differential inclusion
∂P
∂t
∈ V¯(P) (29)
with initial conditions P(0) for any t ∈ [0, T], T ∈ R+, and DT(P(0)) denotes the set of all
solutions of Equation (29) starting from P(0).
For any P where V(P) is continuous, also V¯(P) = {V(P)}, while if V(P) discontin-
uous, V¯(P) is the set-valued function defined in Equation (28). By Lemma 2 V(P) is
bounded, and so we have that V¯(P) is bounded and upper semi-continuous. Hence,
the requirements of Theorem 1 are satisfied and Equation (29) describes the dynamics
of the log-productivity distribution in the limit of N being large for any t ∈ [0, T] . ✷
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2. Observe that in the case of pure innovation the log-productivity
ai(t) = log Ai(t) of firm i grows according to Equation (2), from which we get ai(t) =
ai(0) + ∑
t
j=1 ϑ(tj), where tj ≥ 0 denotes the time at which the j-th innovation arrives.
Assuming that the random variables ϑ(t) are independent and identically distributed
with finite mean µϑ < ∞ and variance σ
2
ϑ < ∞, then by virtue of the central limit the-
orem, ∑tj=1 ϑ(tj) converges to a normal distribution N (µϑt, σ2ϑt). Consequently, Ai(t)
34See also Roth and Sandholm [2013].
35The set V¯(P) is upper semi-continuous if for any P ∈ R|S| and any open setO containing V¯(P), there
exists a neighborhood N of P such that V¯(N) ∈ O.
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converges to a log-normal distribution with mean µA = e
tµϑ+
1
2 tσ
2
ϑ and variance σ2A =(
etσ
2
ϑ − 1
)
e2tµϑ+tσ
2
ϑ . Setting η0 = 1− p, η1 = p, ηb = 0 for b = 2, 3, . . . and noting that
µϑ = p and σ
2
ϑ = p(1− p) yields the desired proposition. ✷
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3. Inserting Equation (9) into the differential Equation (10),
and summation over a yields the evolution of the cumulative log-productivity distribu-
tion F(t) in the general case of q ∈ [0, 1] as given by
∂Fa(t)
∂t
= Pa(1− q)(1− Fa) + PaFa
+ Pa−1q(1− q)(1− Fa) + Pa−1(1− q)(1− Fa) + Pa−1Fa
+ Pa−2q2(1− q)(1− Fa) + Pa−2q(1− q)(1− Fa) + Pa−2(1− q)(1− Fa) + Pa−2Fa
+ . . .
− Fa.
This can be written as
∂Fa(t)
∂t
= Fa(t)
2 + (1− q)(1− Fa(t))
a−1
∑
b=0
qbFa−b(t)− Fa(t),
and the first part of the proposition follows.
Next, consider an initial distribution Fa(0) with finite support. Then there exists a
maximal initial log-productivity am such that Fa(0) = 1 for all a ≥ am. From Equation
(11) we see that for all a ≥ am it must hold that ∂Fa(t)∂t = 0 and so Fa(t) = 1 for all t ≥ 0.
In contrast, for all a < am and q > 0 there exists a positive probability that a firm with
log-productivity b > a is imitated, leading to a decrease in Fa(t). Eventually, we then
have that
lim
t→∞ Fa(t) =
{
0, if a < am,
1, if a ≥ am.
This concludes the proof of the proposition. ✷
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4. We see from the definition of the imitation indicator func-
tion in Equation (14) that χim(a, P(t)) = 1 is equivalent to aim(a, P) > ain(a). This can
be written as
a+ log(1− p+ A¯p)︸ ︷︷ ︸
innovation
≤ a+ log
(
Fa(t) +
∞
∑
b=a+1
eb−aPb(t)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
imitation
.
Rearranging terms yields
1− p+ A¯p ≤ Fa(t) +
∞
∑
b=1
ebPb−a(t),
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or equivalently
1− p+ A¯p ≤ 1− Ga(t) +
∞
∑
b=1
ebPb+a(t) = 1+
∞
∑
b=1
(eb − 1)Pb+a(t).
That is
p(A¯− 1) ≤
∞
∑
b=1
(eb − 1)Pb+a(t).
The existence of a threshold a∗ such that χim(a, P(t)) = 1 for all a ≤ a∗ and χim(a, P(t)) =
0 for all a > a∗ can then be written as follows
∞
∑
b=a+1
(eb−a − 1)Pb(t)
{
≥ p(A¯− 1) if a ≤ a∗,
< p(A¯− 1) if a > a∗. (30)
The validity of this inequality, as well as the uniqueness and existence of a∗ is equivalent
to the strict monotonicity of the function f (a, t) defined by
f (a, t) ≡
∞
∑
b=a+1
(eb−a − 1)Pb(t). (31)
f (a, t) is strictly monotonous decreasing if f (a− 1, t)− f (a, t) = (e− 1)Pa(t) > 0. This
holds for all a in the support S of Pa(t) where Pa(t) > 0. Hence, if at time t for all
a ∈ S we have that Pa(t) > 0 then there exists a unique threshold log-productivity a∗
satisfying the above condition.
Consider a small time interval ∆t > 0. We show that if Pb(t) satisfies the above
condition, then it also must hold that f (a − 1, t+ ∆t)− f (a, t+ ∆t) > 0. First, consider
a ≤ a∗. Then for q = 1, Pa(t) > 0 and Fa(t) > Fa−1(t) we get
f (a− 1, t+ ∆t)− f (a, t + ∆t) = (e− 1)Pa(t+ ∆t)
= (e− 1) (Fa(t+ ∆t)− Fa−1(t+ ∆t))
= (e− 1)(Fa(t)2 − Fa−1(t)2)
> 0.
On the other hand, we can write for a > a∗, Pa(t + ∆t) = (1 − p)Pa(t) + pPa−1(t),
which is positive given that Pa(t) > 0 and p ∈ [0, 1] and so f (a, t + ∆t) is monotonic
decreasing. For ∆t → 0 we then obtain the corresponding result in continuous time. ✷
Remark 1. Assume that we can extend Pa(t) to real valued a, which is identical to Pa(t) at
the discrete a ∈ S , but allows Pa(t) to be evaluated at a ∈ R, using the same functional form
of Pa(t) also for real values of a. Then at all points of continuity of f (a, t) ≡ ∑∞b=a+1(eb−a −
1)Pb(t) we can identify a threshold log-productivity a
∗(t) ∈ R satisfying
f (a∗(t), t) =
∞
∑
b=a∗(t)+1
(eb−a
∗(t) − 1)Pb(t) = p(A¯− 1), (32)
that is, evaluated at a = a∗(t), the inequality in (30) becomes an equality (see also Figure A.1).
At the points of discontinuity of f (a, t) = ∑∞b=a+1(e
b−a − 1)Pb(t), the threshold condition
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Figure A.1: The figure shows an illustration of the monotonic decreasing function f (a, t) ≡
∑
∞
b=a∗(t)+1(e
b−a∗(t) − 1)Pb(t) of Equation (31) in the proof of Proposition 4, where its continuous exten-
sion is shown with a dashed line while the function values at the discrete values a ∈ S are indicated with
vertical lines.
becomes
a∗(t) = max
{
a ∈ R≥1 :
∞
∑
b=a+1
(eb−a − 1)Pb(t) ≥ p(A¯− 1)
}
. (33)
Because f (a, t) is monotonic decreasing, and the original function and its extension on contin-
uous a evaluated at the discrete values of a are always identical, it must hold that the largest
discrete value of a such that f (a, t) ≥ p(A¯ − 1) from Equation (30) must be equivalent to
⌊a∗(t)⌋, where a∗(t) is obtained from Equation (32) for all continuity points of f (a, t) and from
Equation (33) for all discontinuity points of f (a, t). This observation will be useful for the proof
of Proposition 6.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5. From Equation (17) we find that in the limit of β → ∞ the
evolution of the log-productivity distribution can be written as
∂Pa(t)
∂t
=


Pa(t)(Fa−1(t) + Fa(t))− Pa(t), if a ≤ a∗,
Pa(t)Fa∗ (t) + (1− p)Pa(t)− Pa(t), if a = a∗ + 1,
Pa(t)Fa∗ (t) + (1− p)Pa(t) + pPa−1(t)− Pa(t), if a > a∗ + 1,
where we have omitted the dependency on P in a∗(P) to simplify the notation. For the
dynamics of the cumulative log-productivity distribution Fa(t) = ∑
a
b=1 Pa(t) we then
get for a ≤ a∗
∂Fa(t)
∂t
=
a
∑
b=1
∂Pb(t)
∂t
=
a
∑
b=1
(Pb(t)(Fb−1(t)− Fb(t)) − Pb(t))
= Fa(t)
2 − Fa(t),
where in the last line from above we have used the results obtained in Proposition 3.
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Next, for a = a∗ + 1 we get
∂Fa∗+1(t)
∂t
=
a∗
∑
b=1
dPb(t)
dt
+
∂Pa∗+1(t)
∂t
= Fa∗+1(t)
2 − Fa∗+1(t) + Pa∗+1(t)Fa∗ (t)− pPa∗+1(t)
= Fa∗(t)
2 − Fa∗(t)− (Fa∗+1(t)− Fa∗(t))(p − Fa∗(t))
= −(1− Fa∗+1(t))Fa∗ (t)− p(Fa∗+1(t)− Fa∗(t)).
Similarly, for a > a∗ + 1 we get
∂Fa(t)
∂t
=
a∗
∑
b=1
∂Pb(t)
∂t
+
∂Pa∗+1(t)
∂t
+
a
∑
b=a∗+2
∂Pb(t)
∂t
= Fa∗(t)
2 − Fa∗(t) + Pa∗+1(t)Fa∗ (t)− pPa∗+1(t)
+
a
∑
b=a∗+2
(Fa∗(t)Pb(t)− p(Pb(t)− Pb−1(t)))
= −(1− Fa(t))Fa∗ (t)− p(Fa(t)− Fa−1(t)).
Putting the above results together we can write
∂Fa(t)
∂t
=
{
Fa(t)2 − Fa(t), if a ≤ a∗,
(Fa(t)− 1)Fa∗ (t)− p(Fa(t)− Fa−1(t)), if a > a∗.
Note that for all a ≥ 1 and t ≥ 0 we have that ∂Fa(t)∂t ≤ 0. Finally, note that from the above
equation it follows that the dynamics of the complementary cdf, Ga(t) = 1− Fa(t), is
given by
∂Ga(t)
∂t
=
{
−(Ga(t)2 − Ga(t)), if a ≤ a∗,
(1− Ga∗(t))Ga(t)− p(Ga(t)− Ga−1(t)), if a > a∗.
✷
Before proceeding with the proof of Proposition 6 the following lemma will be useful:36
Lemma 3. Consider the delay differential equations, g′(x) = G(x, g(x), g(x− 1)) and f ′(x) =
F(x, f (x), f (x − 1)), for x > −1 with identical preshape functions g(x) = f (x) = φ(x) for
x ∈ [−1, 0] and F being a continuous function satisfying a Lipschitz condition with respect to
f . If G ≤ F then g(x) ≤ f (x). Analogously, if G ≥ F then g(x) ≥ f (x).
PROOF OF LEMMA 3. We proceed by the “method of steps” [Smith, 2010, Sec. 3]. For
x ∈ [0, 1), both g(x) and f (x) must satisfy the ODEs
g′(x) = G(x, g(x), φ(x − 1)), (34)
36A similar result can be found in Theorem 3.6 in Smith [2010].
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and
f ′(x) = F(x, f (x), φ(x − 1)). (35)
By the “comparison lemma” (see Theorem 3.2 inWaltman [2004] or Lemma 3.4 in Khalil
[2002]) for ordinary differential equations (ODEs) it follows from the fact that G ≤ F and
that by assumption F being a continuous function satisfying a Lipschitz condition with
respect to f , that on the interval [0, 1)wemust have that f (x) ≥ g(x). Wemay repeat the
above argument to extend the inequality still further to the right. Indeed, for 1 ≤ x < 2,
g(x) must satisfy the ODE
g′(x) = G(x, g(x), g(x − 1)),
where g(x− 1) in the interval [1, 2) is the predetermined solution of the ODE (34), and
f (x) must satisfy the ODE
f ′(x) = F(x, g(x), g(x − 1)),
where f (x− 1) in the interval [1, 2) is the predetermined solution of the ODE (35). Sim-
ilarly, by the comparison lemma for ODEs we then must have that f (x) ≥ g(x) for
x ∈ [1, 2). We then can repeat this argument to establish the inequality f (x) ≥ g(x)
for all x > −1. A similar reasoning can be applied to the case of F ≤ G showing that
f (x) ≤ g(x) for all x > −1. ✷
We are now able to prove Proposition 6.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 6. In the following we show that the stationary log-productivity
distribution Fa(t) is a traveling wave, f (a − a∗(t)) with a∗(t) = a∗0 − νt, consistent with
Definition 1.37 Note that his equivalent to assuming that the complementary distribu-
tion, Ga(t) = 1 − Fa(t), has a traveling wave form g(a − a∗(t)) = g(a − a∗0 − νt) =
1− f (a − a∗0 − νt). We then proceed by showing that there exists a p∗ > 0 such that for
p < p∗ the distribution has asymptotic exponential tails. Note that as the function f (·)
takes real valued arguments, it can be thought of an underlying continuous distribution
such that at each date t and for each a ∈ S , the fraction of firms with probability less
than or equal to a at date t, denoted Fa(t), is equal to f (a − a∗0 − νt) for some constant
ν.38
We first check that a traveling wave satisfies the threshold condition of Proposition
4. By definition, for the threshold log-productivity a∗(t) (possibly real valued) it must
hold that the expected productivity gains from innovation are equal to the expected
productivity gains from imitation at all continuity points of the distribution, which is
equivalent to (see Equation (32) in Remark 1)
Fa∗(t)(t) +
∞
∑
b=a∗(t)+1
eb−a
∗(t)Pb(t) = 1+ p(A¯− 1). (36)
We now show that if the cdf Fa(t) has a traveling wave form f (a− a∗(t)) and the thresh-
37The constant a∗0 in the argument of f (a− a∗0 − νt) does not change its dependency on a− νt charac-
terizing a traveling wave.
38We would like to thank the editor for pointing this out.
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old log-productivity a∗(t) grows linearly with t, i.e. a∗(t) = a∗0 + νt, for an appropriate
traveling wave velocity ν, then the threshold condition in Equation (36) is always satis-
fied. Time invariance of the LHS of Equation (36) requires that39
Fa∗(t+1)(t+ 1) +
∞
∑
b=a∗(t+1)+1
eb−a
∗(t+1)Pb(t+ 1) = Fa∗(t)(t) +
∞
∑
b=a∗(t)+1
eb−a
∗(t)Pb(t).
With our guess for the traveling wave we have that Fa∗(t)(t) = f (0) = Fa∗(t+1)(t + 1).
Hence, what remains to be shown is that
e−a
∗(t+1)
∞
∑
b=a∗(t+1)+1
ebPb(t+ 1) = e
−a∗(t) ∞∑
b=a∗(t)+1
ebPb(t).
We then have that
e−a
∗(t+1)
∞
∑
b=a∗(t+1)+1
ebPb(t+ 1) = e
−a∗(t)−ν ∞∑
b=a∗(t)+ν+1
eb(Fb(t+ 1)− Fb−1(t+ 1))
= e−a
∗(t)−ν ∞∑
b=a∗(t)+ν+1
eb( f (b− a∗(t)− ν)− f (b− 1− a∗(t)− ν))
= e−a
∗(t)−ν ∞∑
b=a∗(t)+1
eb+ν( f (b− a∗(t)) − f (b− a∗(t)− 1))
= e−a
∗(t)−ν ∞∑
b=a∗(t)+1
eb+ν(Fb(t)− Fb−1(t))
= e−a
∗(t)
∞
∑
b=a∗(t)+1
ebPb(t),
and the equality follows. Hence, we have shown that a threshold a∗(t) that grows lin-
early with t as a∗(t) = a∗0 + νt and the assumption of a traveling wave is consistent with
the threshold condition.
In the following we show that there exists a solution of the traveling wave form g(a−
a∗(t)) to Equations (18) and (36) (or equivalently, Equation (30)) with a∗(t) = a∗(0) +
νt by analyzing the solution of Equation (18) for both cases of the log-productivity a
above and below the threshold a∗(t). We then proceed by showing that the stationary
distribution has exponential tails.
Case: a ≤ a∗(t). We assume that the log-productivity distribution for values of a be-
low the threshold a∗(t) has a traveling wave form. Inserting g(a − a∗(t)) = Ga(t) into
Equation (18), where a∗(t) = νt+ a∗0 and denoting by x = a− a∗(t) = a− a∗0 − νt, then
gives for x ≤ 0 (corresponding to a ≤ a∗(t)) that
−νg′(x) = g(x)− g(x)2,
39W.l.o.g. we consider a time increment ∆t = 1.
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or equivalently, the logisitic differential equation
g′(x) = −1
ν
(g(x)− g(x)2). (37)
The standard solution of this logistic differential equation is given by
g(x) =
1
1+
(
1
g0
− 1
)
e
x
ν
, (38)
with the boundary condition g0 = g(0). Thus, we have that limx→−∞ g(x) = 1. In
particular, for x → −∞ we have that g(x) ∼ e− xν and the solution decays exponentially.
Now, Equation (38) establishes Equation (19) as
Ga(t) = g(a− a∗(t)) = 1
1+
(
1
g0
− 1
)
e
a−a∗0−νt
ν
.
We then have that Pa(t) = Ga−1(t) − Ga(t) ∼ e a−νtν , which is equivalent to writing
Pa(t) = e
a−νt
ν + o(1) for a much smaller than a∗ (t) = νt+ a∗0 , and we have shown the
first part of Equation (21).
Case: a > a∗(t). In the following we focus on the case of a > a∗(t) and assume that
the threshold a∗(t) grows linearly with t, that is, a∗(t) = a∗0 + νt. Moreover, we assume
that Ga(t) = g(a − a∗(t)). Substituting x ≡ a− a∗(t) = a− a∗0 − νt in Equation (18) for
a > a∗(t) and noting that40
G⌊a∗(t)⌋(t) = g(⌊a∗(t)⌋ − a∗(t))
= g(⌊a∗0 + νt⌋ − (a∗0 + νt))
= g(⌊a − x⌋ − (a− x))
= g(x+ ⌊−x⌋),
for any integer a, we then get by introducing g0 from above as a constant
−νg′(x) = (1− g(x+ ⌊−x⌋))g(x) − p(g(x) − g(x− 1))
= (1− g0)g(x)− p(g(x) − g(x− 1))− (g(x+ ⌊−x⌋)− g0)g(x)
= (1− g0)g(x)− p(g(x) − g(x− 1))− ε(x)g(x), (39)
for x > 0, x+ ⌊−x⌋ ∈ [−1, 0], where we have used the fact that ∂Ga(t)∂t = −νg′(x), and
we have denoted by
ε(x) ≡ g(x+ ⌊−x⌋)− g0. (40)
Next, note that due to the monotonicity of g(x) we have that ε(x) ≥ 0. Further, note
that the DDE (39) depends on values of the function g(x) in the interval x ∈ [−1, 0],
which is given by Equation (38) and is thus predetermined for computing the solution
40We would like to thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out.
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of Equation (39). Rearranging terms, we can write Equation (39) in the following form
g′(x) + 1− g0 − p
ν
g(x) +
p
ν
g(x− 1) = ε(x)
ν
g(x). (41)
Denoting by a ≡ 1−g0−pν and b ≡ pν , the solution of Equation (41) can be written as the
solution of the following integral equation [cf. Bellman and Cooke, 1963, Eq. (9.3.2), p.
267]
g(x) = g0h(x)− b
∫ 0
−1
h(x− y− 1)φ(y)dy+ 1
ν
∫ x
0
h(x− y)ε(y)g(y)dy, (42)
for x > 0 and h(x) being the solution to the homogeneous part of the DDE (41), i.e.
where the RHS is set to zero,41 and φ(x) is the predetermined solution for g(x) in the
interval x ∈ [−1, 0] from Equation (38). For any x > 0, g(x) in the LHS of Equation
(42) is determined by g(y) for values of y < x. So recursively, Equation (42) completely
specifies g at any point x as a function of g evaluated at points y smaller than x. This
shows existence of the solution. A more detailed discussion can be found in Section 9 in
Bellman and Cooke [1963] and the “method of steps” introduced in Section 3 in Smith
[2010], where the existence of solutions to DDEs is proven in a recursive manner. The
existence of such a solution to the DDE (41) thus justifies our assumption of a traveling
wave.
Hence, we have shown that there exists a solution to Equations (18) and (36) (or
equivalently, Equation (30)) with a∗(t) = a∗(0) + νt for some constant ν, where we set
Ga(t) equal to g(a− a∗(t)) = g(a− a∗0 − νt) for any a ∈ S . This justifies our assumption
of a traveling wave.42
In what follows we derive upper and lower bounds for the solution of Equation
(39), and from these bounds analyze its asymptotic behavior in the limit of large x. In
particular we will show that there exists a p∗ > 0 such that for all p < p∗ the tail of g(x)
can be bounded from above and from below by exponentially decaying functions.43
Let us denote by
ε ≡ sup
x≥0
ε(x) = sup
x≥0
{g(x+ ⌊−x⌋)− g0} = sup
y∈[−1,0]
{g(y)− g0} = g(−1)− g0, (43)
and define g(x) as the solution to the delay differential equation
g′(x) +
1− g0 − p
ν
g(x) +
p
ν
g(x− 1) = ε
ν
g(x). (44)
By virtue of Lemma 3, the solution g(x) of Equation (44) then is an upper bound to the
41This solution is analyzed in Equation (45) below.
42Observe that while ε(x) is only piecewise continuous, g(x) in Equation (42) is continuous in x as the
last term in Equation (42) is an integral over a piecewise continuous function, which is continuous [cf.
e.g. Shilov, 1996, 9.39]. As also the logistic function in Equation (38) is continuous, we obtain that g(x) is
continuous for all x. Consequently, Pb(t) = Gb−1(t)− Gb(t) is continuous, and f (a, t) = ∑∞b=a+1(eb−a −
1)Pb(t) in Remark 1 is continuous in a, as it is the composition of continuous functions.
43Observe that this rules out, for example, any polynomially decaying functions.
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solution g(x) of Equation (41).44 Next, Lemma 3 implies that g(x) ≤ g(x), where g(x)
solves the following delay differential equation
g′(x) + 1− g0 − p
ν
g(x) +
p
ν
g(x− 1) = 0. (45)
Note that both Equations (44) and (45) are instances of a first order linear homogenous
delay differential equation (DDE) with constant coefficients [cf. Bellman and Cooke,
1963; Driver, 1977; Smith, 2010]. In the following we first solve Equation (44), while
Equation (45) can be solved in an analogous way.
Recall that the DDE (44) depends on values of the function g(x) in the interval x ∈
[−1, 0], which is given by Equation (38) and thus predetermined. Asl and Ulsoy [2003]
call this the preshape function, which we have denoted by φ(x). Inserting the definition
of ǫ from Equation (43) into Equation (44) we then have to solve the following DDE
g′(x) + 1− p− g(−1)
ν
g(x) +
p
ν
g(x− 1) = 0, x ∈ (0,∞), (46)
g(x) = φ(x) =
1
1+
(
1
g0
− 1
)
e
x
ν
, x ∈ [−1, 0], (47)
Asl and Ulsoy [2003] have shown that such a DDE admits a solution of the following
form45
g(x) =
∞
∑
k=−∞
cke
−λkx, (48)
with appropriate constants ck. That is, the solution to the DDE in (47) is a linear combi-
nation of exponential functions. We have that g′(x) = −∑∞k=−∞ ckλke−λkx, and inserting
into the DDE (47) yields
ν
∞
∑
k=−∞
ckλke
−λkx = (1− g(−1)− p)
∞
∑
k=−∞
cke
−λkx + p
∞
∑
k=−∞
cke
−λk(x−1).
This can be written as
∞
∑
k=−∞
cke
−λkx
(
λkν− (1− g(−1)− p)− peλk
)
= 0. (49)
The coefficients λk in Equation (49) are the roots of the characteristic equation [cf. Asl
and Ulsoy, 2003]
λkν = 1− g(−1)− p(1− eλk). (50)
44In particular, we can write G(x, g(x), g(x − 1)) ≡ g′(x) = − 1−g0−pν g(x) − pν g(x − 1) + εν g(x) and
G(x, g(x), g(x− 1)) ≡ g′(x) = − 1−g0−pν g(x)− pν g(x− 1) + ε(x)ν g(x). Because ε ≥ ε(x)we must have that
G ≥ G. Moreover, we have that G is continuous and linear in g, and hence Lipschitz in g. It follows that
Lemma 3 applies.
45See in particular Equations (3) and (15) in Asl and Ulsoy [2003].
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Figure A.2: (Left panel) The two real Lambert W functions. (Right panel) The two real roots λ0 and λ1
solving Equation (50) for ν = 1, g(−1) = 0.5 and p = 0.1 indicated with dashed lines and given by
λ0 = 0.5783 and λ−1 = 3.4018.
The roots of Equation (50) can be written in closed form as
λk =
g(−1) + p− 1
ν
+Wk
(
− p
ν
e−
g(−1)+p−1
ν
)
, (51)
where Wk(z) is the k-th branch of the Lambert W function satisfying Wk(z)e
Wk(z) = z
for k = 0,±1,±2, . . . [cf. Corless et al., 1996]. Note that there can be at most two real
roots W0(z) and W−1(z). An illustration is given in Figure A.2 (left panel).46 The real
parts of the higher order roots are dominated by the ones of W0(z) and W−1(z) [Asl
and Ulsoy, 2003]. As
p
ν e
− g(−1)+p−1ν ≥ 0, there exist either two real roots or we have
the case that both coincide, namely when the argument − pν e−
g(−1)+p−1
ν of the Lambert
function in Eq. (51) equals − 1e , and λ0 = λ−1 = g(−1)+p−1−νν . The two roots are the
further separated from each other, the closer the argument− pν e−
g(−1)+p−1
ν of the Lambert
function is to zero (see Figure A.2, left panel), which is the case for example when the
innovation success probability p is small. Moreover, the existence of real roots requires
that
p
ν e
− g(−1)+p−1ν ≤ 1e , or equivalently, pν ≤ e−
1−g(−1)
ν e
p
ν−1. An illustration for the two real
roots λ0 and λ−1 solving Equation (50) is shown in Figure A.2 (right panel).
We next show that all the roots of the characteristic Equation (50) have positive real
parts. Corollary 4.10 in Smith [2010, page 56]47 shows that a sufficient condition for all
roots x of the equation x− b− cex = 0 to have a positive real part is b > 0 and |b| > |c|.
We can write Equation (50) as λk − 1−p−g(−1)ν − pν eλk = 0, so that the corresponding
coefficients are b = 1−p−g(−1)ν and c =
p
ν . The sufficient condition then becomes 1−
46Note further that |W0(z)| ≤ |W−1(z)| while the following bounds hold: ln z − ln ln z ≤ W0(z) ≤
ln z− 12 ln ln z for every z ≥ e, and 1 < −W−1(z) ≤ − 1z for every z ∈
(
− 1e , 0
)
.
47In particular, part (i) of Corollary 4.10 in Smith [2010] considers the equation y+ b+ ce−ry = 0, with
b, c being real coefficients and r > 0. Then, if b > 0 and |b| > |c| all the roots have negative real parts
for all r ≥ 0. Substituting x = −y and setting r = 1 gives x − b− cey = 0, which is the equation that we
consider. Finally, note that if all the roots y have negative real parts, then all the roots x = −y must have
positive real parts.
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p− g(−1) > p, or equivalently, 12(1− g(−1)) > p. First, assume that g0 < 1. Because
g(−1) is determined by the logistic function in Equation (38), which is strictly smaller
than one if g0 < 1, we have that
1
2(1− g(−1)) > 0. Let p∗ > 0 be the smallest possible
value of 12(1 − g(−1)). We then can always find a (real valued) p between p∗ and 0
such that the inequality holds for all p less than p∗. Next, assume that g0 = 1. From
the logistic function in Equation (38) we know that g0 = 1 implies that also g(−1) = 1.
Moreover, from Equation (43) we can conclude that ε = 0. In this case the solutions to
the upper and lower bounds in Equations (44) and (45) coincide, andmust be equivalent
to the solution to the original Equation (39), which is uniformly bounded by one as it is
a complementary cumulative distribution function. Thus there cannot be any positive
real parts in the characteristic roots. This shows that all the roots λk of the characteristic
Equation (50) have positive real parts for p small enough.48
The coefficients ck in Equation (48) follow from the preshape function, which can be
written as (see Eq. (77) in Asl and Ulsoy [2003])49
φ(x) ≡ 1
1+
(
1
g0
− 1
)
e
x
ν
=
∞
∑
k=−∞
cke
−λkx, x ∈ [−1, 0]. (52)
In order to compute the Lambert coefficients, ck, consider a 2K+ 1 discretization{
−1,−2K− 1
2K
,−2K− 2
2K
, . . . ,− 2
2K
,− 1
2K
, 0
}
of the interval [−1, 0]. Taking into account only 2K+ 1 Lambert coefficients in Equation
(52), such that
φ(x) ≈
K
∑
k=−K
cke
−λkx, x ∈ [−1, 0], (53)
we get 

φ(0)
φ(− 12K )
φ(− 22K )
...
φ(− 2K−22K )
φ(− 2K−12K )
φ(−1)


︸ ︷︷ ︸
φ
≈


e−λ−K·0 . . . e−λK·0
e−λ−K·(− 12K ) . . . e−λK·(− 12K )
e−λ−K·(− 22K ) . . . e−λK·(− 22K )
...
e−λ−K·(− 2K−22K ) . . . e−λK·(− 2K−22K )
e−λ−K·(− 2K−12K ) . . . e−λK·(− 2K−12K )
e−λ−K·(−1) . . . e−λK ·(−1)


︸ ︷︷ ︸
ΩK
×


c−K
c−K+1
c−K+2
...
cK−2
cK−1
cK


︸ ︷︷ ︸
c
.
We then have that c ≈ Ω−1K φ, which becomes exact in the limit of K → ∞, and the
48In our numerical simulations we find that this condition actually holds for any value of p that we
have considered.
49Any continuous function φ(x) can be represented as an infinite series using the Lambert coefficients,
ck, and the Lambert modes, e
−λkx [Asl and Ulsoy, 2003].
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Lambert coefficients ck are given by
ck = lim
K→∞
(
Ω
−1
K φ
)
k
. (54)
Note that for large x the dominant term in Equation (48) is the one with the smallest
exponent, so that asymptotically it holds that50
g(x) ∼ e−λ0x, x → ∞, (55)
where λ0 is the smallest root of the characteristic Equation (50).
Similarly, the lower bound from the solution of the DDE (44) is given by
g(x) =
∞
∑
k=−∞
cke
−λkx, (56)
with appropriate constants ck, where the exponents λk solve the characteristic equation
λk =
g0 + p− 1
ν
+Wk
(
− p
ν
e−
g0+p−1
ν
)
. (57)
Hence, we have that g(x) ≤ g(x) ≤ g(x), and we have shown Equation (20). Observe
further that g(x) − g(x) ∼ e−λ0x − e−λ0x ∼ e−λ0x → 0, for large x when λ0 > λ0.51
Moreover, we have that g(x) = O
(
e−λ0x
)
for large x,52 so that we can write Ga(t) =
O
(
e−λ0(a−νt)
)
as a becomes much larger than a∗(t). As Pa(t) = Ga−1(t) − Ga(t), the
same asymptotic behavior holds for Pa(t). This proves the second part of Equation (21).
✷
Remark 2. In our numerical simulations we find that the perturbation ε(x) in Equation
(40) is typically small and can be neglected to obtain a fairly good approximation. A
comparison of the numerical solution of Equation (18) with the analytical predictions
from Equation (38) below the threshold, and the solution of the DDE (45) above the
threshold, together with the solution of Equation (56) with exponents from Equation
(57) for K = 3 Lambert modes, and the exponent λ0 obtained from Equation (22), are
shown in Figure A.3 (color online). The figure shows a fairly good agreement between
the theoretical predictions and a direct numerical integration of Equation (18).
Remark 3. In the following we show how Equations (22) and (23) are computed. Moti-
vated by Remark 2, we assume that the perturbation ε(x) can be neglected, so that the
solution to the original DDE (41) is sufficiently well approximated by the solution to the
DDE (45). Observe that the exponents λk in Equation (57) depend on the endogenous
variables ν and g0, and so Equation (57) cannot be used to compute λk directly. In the
following we avoid this problem by assuming that the solution to the DDE (45), given
50Recall that we have shown above that all λk have positive real parts.
51Because g(x) ≤ g(x) we must have that e−λ0x ≤ e−λ0x for large x, implying that λ0 > λ0.
52This is because limx→∞ g(x)/g(x) ≤ 1. See also the definition in Footnote 18.
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Figure A.3: The stable shape of the complementary cumulative distribution function Ga(t) for p = 0.1 (left
panel) and the corresponding probability mass function Pa(t) (right panel) (color online). The traveling
wave has been detrended such that ⌊a∗(t)⌋ coincides with the origin. The vertical red line indicates the
threshold ⌊a∗(t)⌋. The blue stars indicate the numerical solution of Equation (18). The black line for
values below the threshold is computed with the analytical solution from Equation (38) where G⌊a∗(t)⌋
is taken from the numerical solution of Equation (18). The black line for values above the threshold is
obtained from a numerical integration of the DDE ( 45) (using Matlab’s dde23 solver) with the preshape
function from Equation (38). The magenta line indicates the solution for values above the threshold
obtained from Equation ( 56) with exponents from Equation (57) and K = 3 Lambert modes. The green
line indicates the exponent λ0 obtained from Equation (22).
in Equation (56), is dominated by the smallest exponent λ0 (corresponding to the term
with the smallest decay as x increases), and then proceed by computing this exponent.
First, note that from the threshold condition in Equation (36) we obtain
∞
∑
b=1
(eb − 1)Pb+a∗(t)(t) = p(A¯− 1).
Using Equation (56) we have that Ga(t) = ∑
∞
k=−∞ cke−λk(a−νt), and we can write
Pa(t) = Ga−1(t)− Ga(t)
=
∞
∑
k=−∞
ck(e
λk − 1)e−λk(a−νt)
=
∞
∑
k=−∞
c˜ke
−λk(a−νt),
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where we have denoted by c˜k ≡ ck(eλk − 1). It then follows that
p(A¯− 1) =
∞
∑
b=1
(eb − 1)
∞
∑
k=−∞
c˜ke
−λk(b+a∗(t)−νt)
=
∞
∑
b=1
(eb − 1)
∞
∑
k=−∞
c˜ke
−λk(b+a∗0)
=
∞
∑
k=−∞
c˜ke
−λka∗0
∞
∑
b=1
(eb − 1)e−λkb
=
∞
∑
k=−∞
c˜ke
−λka∗0
(
1
eλk−1 − 1 +
1
1− eλk
)
. (58)
As discussed in the proof of Proposition 6, the principal root λ0 is well separated
from the other roots, the closer the argument − pν e−
g0+p−1
ν of the Lambert W function in
Equation (57) is to zero. Then only the principal Lambert mode dominates in Equation
(58), and we can write
p(A¯− 1) = c˜0e−λ0a∗0
(
1
eλ0−1− 1 +
1
1− eλ0
)
+ o(1). (59)
The ccdf evaluated at the threshold can be written as
g0 = Ga∗(t)(t) =
∞
∑
k=0
cke
−λka∗0 =
∞
∑
k=−∞
c˜k
eλk − 1e
−λka∗0 .
Similarly, when the principal Lambert mode dominates in the above equation we obtain
g0 =
c˜0
eλ0 − 1e
−λ0a∗0 + o(1),
so that Equation (50) can be written as
λ0ν = 1−
c˜0
eλ0 − 1e
−λ0a∗0 − p(1− eλ0) + o(1). (60)
Inserting c˜0e
−λ0a∗0 from Equation (59) into Equation (60) (and dropping terms of the
order o(1)) then gives
λ0ν = 1−
p(A¯− 1)
eλ0 − 1
(
1
eλ0−1− 1 +
1
1− eλ0
)−1
− p(1− eλ0).
Hence, simplifying this expression we obtain the traveling wave velocity ν as a function
of the principal exponent λ0 given by
ν =
1
λ0
(
1+ p(eλ0 − 1)− p(A¯− 1)(1− e
1−λ0)
e− 1
)
. (61)
The traveling wave velocity ν as a function of λ0 for different values of p can be seen in
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Figure A.4: (Left) The traveling wave velocity ν as a function of λ0 for different values of p = 0.1, p =
0.5 and p = 1. (Right) The ν minimizing value of λ0 for the same values of p. The figures show that
the minimizing value of λ0 is decreasing for increasing values of p, and consequently, the front of the
traveling wave becomes steeper. Moreover, the velocity ν of the traveling wave increases with increasing
values of p.
Figure A.4 (left panel). Of particular interest will be the smallest admissible value of ν.53
Note that the RHS of Equation (61) is a convex function of λ0 which is characterized by a
unique global minimum (see also the left panel in Figure A.4). The corresponding value
of λ0 minimizing ν can be found from the corresponding first-order condition (FOC)
given by
dν
dλ0
=
1− e+ p(A¯+ e− 2) + (e− 1)eλ0p(λ0− 1)− (A¯− 1)e1−λ0p(1+ λ0)
(e− 1)λ20
= 0.
The FOC from above is equivalent to
e− 1
A¯+ e− 2+ (e− 1)eλ0(λ0 − 1)− (A¯− 1)e1−λ0(1+ λ0)
= p, (62)
which is illustrated in Figure A.4 (right panel). This equation can be further simplified
to
eλ0(λ0 − 1)−
A¯− 1
e− 1 e
1−λ0(1+ λ0) +
A¯+ e− 2
e− 1 =
1
p
. (63)
A comparison of the exponentially decaying solution with λ0 obtained from Equation
(63) and the numerical solution of Equation (18) is shown in Figure A.3.
53A generic selection principle applies, where an extremal value for ν is realized from sufficiently steep
initial conditions [cf. Bramson, 1983; van Saarloos, 2003].
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PROOF OF LEMMA 1. Let T be the terminal period. Then we have that
VT−1(Ai(T − 1), P(T − 1))
= max
{∫
dFin(ϑ)ψAi(T − 1)A¯ϑ,
∫
dFim(ϑ|Ai(T − 1), P(T − 1))ψAi(T − 1)A¯ϑ
}
= ψAi(T − 1)max
{∫
dFin(ϑ)A¯ϑ ,
∫
dFim(ϑ|Ai(T − 1), P(T − 1))A¯ϑ
}
.
Observe that the expected productivity gain from imitation,
∫
dFim(ϑ|Ai(T − 1), P(T −
1))A¯ϑ, is increasing in Ai(T − 1), and the expected productivity gain from innovation,∫
dFin(ϑ)A¯ϑ , is non-decreasing in Ai(T − 1). Hence, VT−1(Ai(T − 1), P(T − 1)) is in-
creasing in Ai(T − 1). Next, as the induction hypothesis, assume that VT−t(Ai(T −
t), P(T − t)) is increasing in Ai(T − t). Then we have that
VT−t−1(Ai(T − t− 1), P(T − t− 1))
= max
{∫
dFin(ϑ)ψAi(T − t− 1)A¯ϑ + δVT−t(Ai(T − t− 1)A¯ϑ, P(T − t)),∫
dFim(ϑ|Ai(T − t− 1), P(T − t− 1))ψAi(T − t− 1)A¯ϑ + δVT−t(Ai(T − t− 1)A¯ϑ, P(T − t))
}
.
As both, VT−t(·, ·) and the per period profit
∫
dFsi(t)(ϑ|·)ψAi(·)A¯ϑ are increasing in the
productivity Ai(·) (for both strategies, innovation, si(t) = in, and imitation, si(t) =
im), it follows that also VT−t−1(·, ·) is increasing in the productivity. This proves the
induction step. ✷
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 8. Assume for a contradiction that the value function is in-
creasing in the productivity Ai(t), but that the optimal strategy is not to maximize the
expected productivity gain in that period. Then not only the current expected per pe-
riod profit is smaller, but, because of the monotonicity of the value function, also the
expected value function in the next period is lower. However, this contradicts the as-
sumption that the strategy is optimal, and thus cannot be the solution to the Bellman
Equation (27). ✷
In the following we derive a lemma and a corollary which will help us to show
that Equation (24) admits a traveling wave solution with a stable shape.54 First, from
Equation (24) we can derive the following lemma:
Lemma 4. Let F
(1)
a (t) and F
(2)
a (t) be solutions of Equation (24) with initial data chosen such
that F
(1)
a (0) ≥ F(2)a (0). Then for all t > 0 we have that F(1)a (t) ≥ F(2)a (t).
PROOF OF LEMMA 4. We introduce the difference
Va(t) = F
(2)
a (t)− F(1)a (t).
54Our results follow Bramson [1983], who analyzed the traveling wave solution u(x, t) = w(x− νt) of
the Kolmogorov equation ∂u∂t = f (u) +
∂2u
∂x2
.
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In the following we show that if Va(0) ≤ 0 then Va(t) ≤ 0 for all t > 0. We can write
Equation (24) as follows
∂Fa(t)
∂t
+ Fa(t) =
2q− 1
2
Fa(t)
2 +
3− 2q− p
2
Fa(t) +
p
2
Fa−1(t).
We then get for Va(t)
∂Va(t)
∂t
+Va(t) =
2q− 1
2
((F
(2)
a (t))
2 − (F(1)a (t))2) + 3− 2q− p
2
Va(t) +
p
2
Va−1(t)
=
2q− 1
2︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
Va(t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0
(F
(2)
a (t) + F
(1)
a (t))︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
+
3− 2q− p
2︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
Va(t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0
+
p
2︸︷︷︸
≥0
Va−1(t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0
.
Hence, we find that if Va(t) ≤ 0 for all a ≥ 0 then also ∂Va(t)/∂t +Va(t) ≤ 0.
Next, we show that if Va(t) ≤ 0 and ∂Va(t)/∂t + Va(t) ≤ 0 then also Va(t+ s) ≤ 0
for all s > 0. For this purpose, let ǫ = s/n with n ∈ N. For n being sufficiently large
(and ǫ sufficiently small) we can use a first-order Taylor approximation to write
Va(t+ ǫ) = Va(t) +
∂Va(t)
∂t
ǫ
Va(t+ 2ǫ) = Va(t+ ǫ) +
∂Va(t+ ǫ)
∂t
ǫ
...
Va(t+ nǫ) = Va(t+ (n− 1)ǫ) + ∂Va(t+ (n− 1)ǫ)
∂t
ǫ
We can assume that Va(t) ≤ 0. If ∂Va(t)/∂t ≤ 0 then we also have that Va(t + ǫ) ≤ 0.
Otherwise, we observe that
Va(t+ ǫ) = Va(t) +
∂Va(t)
∂t
ǫ ≤ Va(t) + ∂Va(t)
∂t
≤ 0,
so that also in this case Va(t+ ǫ) ≤ 0. We can repeat this argument for all ǫ, 2ǫ, . . . , nǫ =
s and show that Va(t+ s) ≤ 0. ✷
A direct consequence of Lemma 4 is the following corollary.
Corollary 1. Let Fa(t) be a solution of Equation (24) with Heaviside initial data, that is
Fa(0) = Θ(a− am) =
{
0, if a < am,
1, if a ≥ am.
(64)
Further, define mǫ(t) = inf{a : Fa(t) ≥ ǫ} for any ǫ ∈ [0, 1]. Then we have that Fa−mǫ(t)(t)
converges to some function fǫ(a) as t→ ∞.
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Figure A.5: Illustration of distributions Fa(t) and Fa(t+ s) at times t and t+ s for s > 0.
PROOF OF COROLLARY 1. For t0, b ∈ R+ we set for any a ≥ 0
F
(1)
a (t) = Fa−mǫ(t0)(t)
F
(2)
a (t) = Fa−mǫ(t0+b)(t+ b).
If we start from Heaviside initial data we have that F
(1)
a (0) ≥ F(2)a (0) and Lemma 4
applies.55 It follows that F
(1)
a (t) ≥ F(2)a (t) for all t > 0. We then can write
0 ≤ Fa−mǫ(t0+b)(t0 + b) ≤ Fa−mǫ(t0)(t0) ≤ 1.
For each value of b this is a decreasing sequence of real numbers which is bounded
from below and thus its infimum is the limit. In particular, since t0, b and ǫwere chosen
arbitrarily, we obtain that Fa−m0(t)(t) converges to some f (a) ≥ 0 from above as t → ∞.
An illustration can be seen in Figure A.5. ✷
We are now in place to give a proof of Proposition 7.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 7. Let ǫ > 0, then by Corollary 1 it holds
lim
t→∞ Fa−mǫ(t)(t) = fǫ(a).
Because of convergence it holds for the total derivative
lim
t→∞
dFa−mǫ(t)(t)
dt
= 0,
55To see this, note that mǫ(t) is increasing in t as Fa(t) is decreasing in t because the RHS of (24) always
less than zero. Consequently, it holds F
(1)
a (0) = Fa−mǫ(t0)(0) = Θ(a − (am + mǫ(t0))) ≥ Θ(a − (am +
mǫ(t0 + b))) = Fa−mǫ(t0+b)(0). The latter is by definition of the Heavyside-Function an upper bound for
any probability distribution function with support restricted to the interval [am + mǫ(t0 + b),∞). This
applies in particular to F
(2)
a (0) = Fa−mǫ(t0+b)(b) for any b ∈ R+, so that we have that F
(1)
a (0) ≥ F(2)a (0).
Hence, we can make use of Lemma 4.
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or equivalently
∂Fa−mǫ(t)(t)
∂t
+
∂Fa−mǫ(t)(t)
∂a
dmǫ(t)
dt
= o(1).
Using Equation (24), the above equation can be written as follows
o(1) =
2q− 1
2
Fa−mǫ(t)(t)
2 +
1− 2q− p
2
Fa−mǫ(t)(t) +
p
2
Fa−mǫ(t)−1(t)
+
∂Fa−mǫ(t)(t)
∂a
dmǫ(t)
dt
.
Integrating over [0, α) we obtain
o(1) =
∫ α
0
(
2q− 1
2
Fa−mǫ(t)(t)
2 +
1− 2q− p
2
Fa−mǫ(t)(t) +
p
2
Fa−mǫ(t)−1(t))da
+ (Fα−mǫ(t)(t)− F0−mǫ(t)(t))
dmǫ(t)
dt
.
Looking at the limit over time (limt→∞ on both sides) we obtain
o(1) =
∫ α
0
(
2q− 1
2
fǫ(a)
2 +
1− 2q− p
2
fǫ(a) +
p
2
fǫ(a− 1))da
+ ( fǫ(a)− fǫ(0)) lim
t→∞
dmǫ(t)
dt
.
As everything except limt→∞ dmǫ(t)dt does not depend on t we can conclude that there is
a constant ν such that limt→∞ dmǫ(t)dt = ν.
Further, we must have that Fmǫ(t)(t) = Fmǫ(t+s)(t + s), or equivalently, Fνt(t) =
Fν(t+s)(t + s), and this is satisfied for Fa(t) = f (a − νt). It follows that the solution
of Equation (24) must be a traveling wave. Note that due to the stable shape of the
traveling wave, the above result holds for any value of ǫ. ✷
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